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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a plaintiff's employment discrimination lawyer-let's
call her Zoe-meeting a new client. Austin, the new client, tells Zoe a
familiar story. He believes he wasn't promoted at work because he is
African American. Of course, his boss didn't say, "Austin, I can't pro-
mote you. You are African American." Yet, Austin believes he was
more than qualified, and a white person got the job instead.
Zoe sympathizes, but isn't that hopeful. Austin's story fits the ba-
sic framework of an employment discrimination case, but Zoe thinks
that the framework (namely the McDonnell Douglas' test) fails to iden-
tify the subtle, as opposed to overt, discrimination Austin and most
plaintiffs allege. That is, the law works well at identifying and prohibit-
ing the individual manager who fires an employee after negative com-
ments about the employee's ancestry, but not so well with unconscious
or hidden discrimination. In addition, Zoe has found federal courts
1 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing the
prima facie case as plaintiff showing "(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that
he applied and was qualified for ajob for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from per-
sons of complainant's qualifications").
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quick to accept defendants' nondiscriminatory reason for what hap-
pened. Unless she can settle the claim, Zoe warns Austin, he
shouldn't expect any sort of legal redress.
Zoe's advice mirrors the current state of legal scholarship on em-
ployment discrimination litigation. Empirical studies amply demon-
strate a plaintiff's slim chances of winning an employment
discrimination suit.2 For example, employment discrimination plain-
tiffs prevail at rates roughly half that of insurance plaintiffs.3 Only
prisoners fare worse as plaintiffs.4 Scholars have also documented
well the judiciary's failure to redress more subtle discrimination 5 and
the judiciary's readiness to defer to the defendant's stated reason for
the challenged employment action.
6
2 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or-Judge
Trial: Defendants'Advantage, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 125, 154 (2001) [hereinafter Cler-
mont & Eisenberg, Jury or Judge]; Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litiga-
tion Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 153 (2002) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg,
Realities]; Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429 (2004); Kevin M.
Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment-Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 547, 547
(2003); John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 985, 990, 1001 (1991);John Golmant,
Analysis and Perspective: Statistical Trends in the Disposition of Employment Discrimination
Cases, 20 Empl. Discrimination Rep. (BNA) 602, 604 (Apr. 30, 2003); Michael Selmi,
Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard To Win?, 61 LA. L. REv. 555, 555
(2001); see infra notes 199-200 (detailing these studies).
3 Mike Selmi has shown that plaintiffs are more likely to lose an employment
discrimination suit than a personal injury or insurance case at the trial court level.
Selmi, supra note 2, at 559.
4 See Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and
Prisoner Cases, 77 GEo. L.J. 1567, 1578 (1989); Selmi, supra note 2, at 561.
5 See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161
(1995); Deborah Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 2229 (1995); Rachel F. Moran, The Elusive Nature of Discrimination, 55 STAN. L.
REv. 2365 (2003); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 (1999).
For descriptions of this debate, see Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Per-
sonal Animosity Presumption in Title 1I and the Return to "No Cause"Employment, 81 TEx.
L. REv. 1177, 1188-90, 1195-209 (2003); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 468-74 (2001). This is
explored further infra Part II.B.1.
6 See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title
VII A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1990); William R.
Corbett, The "Fall" of Summers, The Rise of "Pretext Plus, " and the Escalating Subordina-
tion of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to Employment at Will: Lessons from McKen-
non and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REv. 305 (1996); Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights
and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIo ST. L.J.
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Yet, Zoe's advice is ultimately incomplete, as is the current schol-
arship. We actually know little empirically about how employment dis-
crimination claims filed on the basis of race and national origin fare.7
Ruth Colker has studied disability cases separately,8 as have Ann Juli-
ano and Stewart Schwab for sexual harassment claims. 9 Yet, no one
has undertaken that work for race. These cases haven't had their
story told in any comprehensive way.10 This Article undertakes this
1443 (1996). For a discussion of this argument, see Derum & Engle, supra note 5, at
1190-92, 1209-24. This is explored further infra Part II.B.2.
7 For the sake of simplicity, I'll refer to race and national origin employment
discrimination cases as "race employment discrimination cases" or the like. While the
concept of race is intensely debated, using the word "race" is simply more concise
than "race and national origin" in an already wordy field of law review articles.
8 See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 109 & n.45 (1999) [hereinafter Colker, ADA Windfall]
(analyzing 475 appellate decisions on Wesdaw and 615 trial court outcomes in an
ABA database); Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 62 OHIo ST. L.J. 239, 245 (2001) [hereinafter Colker, Winning and Losing] (ana-
lyzing 720 appellate opinions on Westlaw); see also Ruth Colker, The Death of Section
504, 35 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 219 (2002) (analyzing the impact of the ADA on Section
504 outcomes).
9 See Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 548 (2001) (examining 666 sexual harassment opinions from 1986
to 1996 found on Lexis and Westlaw). For citation to more limited studies of sex
discrimination cases, see id. at 549 n.2. Of particular importance is a study of the lack
of interest defense in both sex and race employment discrimination cases. See Vicki
Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the
Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REv.
1073 (1992) (examining lack of interest defense in race and sex employment discrim-
ination cases from 1965 to 1989, which included 117 published opinions, plus a small
data set from the ABA).
10 I found only one recent study that specifically examined employment discrimi-
nation cases filed on the basis of race or national origin. David Benjamin Oppen-
heimer examined California jury verdicts in 272 employment discrimination cases
from 1998 and 1999 and was able to disaggregate the data by sex and race claims. See
David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employ-
ment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Wo-
men and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 511, 515-16 (2003) (using data from
California's major jury verdict reporters). Oppenheimer summarized his thorough
and interesting study of California juries with this conclusion: "the case is strong that
judges and juries in California are far more skeptical of race and sex-based employ-
ment discrimination claims brought by black women, and age-based employment dis-
crimination claims brought by women over forty, than other employment law claims."
Id. at 566.
Older studies of race and national origin employment discrimination were like-
wise limited in their scope. See, e.g., Schultz & Petterson, supra note 9 (examining the
lack of interest defense in race employment discrimination cases); Peter Siegelman &
John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and
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task, to provide the first national, comprehensive examination of race
employment discrimination.
Through empirical studies of 659 race cases,"' 172 gender
cases,1 2 and 109 age cases,1 3 I seek to answer two sets of questions.
First, are plaintiffs statistically more likely to win some types of race
employment discrimination cases? Will a particular mix of plaintiffs,
defendants, claims, and defenses lead to a more winnable lawsuit for
plaintiffs? More particularly, while some have criticized the applica-
tion of traditional employment discrimination principles to nontradi-
tional employment discrimination plaintiffs (read: white males), are
these plaintiffs successfully availing themselves of employment dis-
crimination law? Are they even commonplace? These questions find
their answers in Part 1.14 Second, how do race employment discrimi-
nation plaintiffs fare when compared with those alleging gender or
age discrimination? Are courts treating different types of discrimina-
tion differently? This is the subject of Part II.
From the answers to these two broad sets of inquiries, I argue that
the current perception of judges as ignoring subtle discrimination
and deferring to defendants is perhaps a little too optimistic. The
current status of race employment discrimination is actually worse
than previously told. Courts are doing more than deferring to de-
fendants; they are actually agreeing with the defendants due to what I
term an "anti-race plaintiff ideology."15
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I chronicles my first
empirical step: a search for the statistically more winnable suit alleging
race discrimination in employment. Particular factors certainly indi-
cate a stronger chance for plaintiffs' success. A plaintiff represented
by counsel and responding to a motion to dismiss is statistically more
likely to win than the overall sample, but neither factor is surprising. 16
Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAw & Soc'v Ruv. 1133, 1152 (1990)
(identifying differences in race employment discrimination cases at some data points
in their comparison of published opinions with unpublished opinions).
11 See infra Tables Al, A2, A3 & A4.
12 See infra Table A5.
13 See infra Table A6.
14 See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
15 This is different from what Kevin Clermont, Ted Eisenberg, and Stewart
Schwab have labeled an "anti-plaintiff bias." See infra Part III.A. I am not suggesting
that all plaintiffs are treated unfairly. Instead, I am contending that race plaintiffs are
treated worse for reasons that are perhaps unknowable or indefinable, but for reasons
that don't appear to be race neutral.
16 See infra Part I.D.1-2. Filing in a particular district court may also improve a
plaintiff's chance of a judicial win, but the data here is far from complete. See infra
Part I.D.3.
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By contrast, the other factors studied have little, if any, impact on
judicial success. 17 Overall, district court judges treat race and national
origin employment discrimination cases fairly alike, no matter who
the plaintiffs and defendants are, no matter what their respective ar-
guments are, and no matter what the race and gender of the judge
are. The bottom line for all the cases studied is simple: plaintiffs al-
most always lose when courts resolve their claims. For example, for
the 192 race cases filed in the year 2002 in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Texas, only one plaintiff
won when the judiciary18 in some fashion decided the case-a jury
trial in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 19 For the 125 cases in
which plaintiff won in an opinion published in the year 2002, the
number of plaintiffs'judicial victories was four, all of which were again
jury trials.2
0
Part II explores possible race neutral explanations for these dis-
mal outcomes. One possible reason might be that all the good cases
settle, leaving only the weakest for judicial resolution.21 The low judi-
cial win rate would then be explained by the merit of the cases de-
cided by the judiciary. The data does not support this explanation. If
defendants settle at such a high rate to explain the low plaintiff win
rates, one would expect high settlement rates for cases in which the
plaintiff won a summary judgment motion, which signals some legal
merit to plaintiff's claim. But the empirical studies in this Article indi-
cate that cases in which plaintiff won a summary judgment motion
had a lower settlement rate than the cases as a whole.
A second set of race neutral explanations would emphasize, as
the current literature argues, the judiciary's inability to remedy subtle
discrimination and thejudiciary's deference to defendant's rendering
of why plaintiff wasn't chosen.2 2 While both points are very likely true
to some degree, the studies indicate that the explanations are in a key
respect incomplete. The two rationales have equal applicability to all
forms of employment discrimination-whether it be age, disability,
17 See infra Part I.D.4-5.
18 A main topic of this Article is the role of the judiciary in employment discrimi-
nation litigation, so a definition of "judiciary" seems in order. Byjudiciary, I refer to
the federal district courts in all eighty-four districts and any action that occurs via
federal district court jurisdiction. That is, I include jury trials, which are very much
affected by a variety ofjudicial orders, such as proper jury instructions and rulings on
motions forjudgment as a matter of law. Jury trials are quite infrequent in the studies
included in this Article, but provided the very few instances of a judicial win.
19 See infra note 112; see also infra Tables A3 & A4.
20 See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text; see also infra Table 2.
21 See infra Part H.A.
22 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
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gender, national origin, race, or religion. In all contexts, a court could
equally ignore evidence of subtle discrimination or too often defer to
the defendant's story. Treating types of discrimination similarly, in
fact, has some empirical support. Research by Kevin Clermont and
Stewart Schwab, for example, has suggested that "pretrial and trial win
rates are similar across types of discrimination cases."23 One might
also think that disposition rates would be relatively the same across the
many types of discrimination given the substantial similarity in the law-
yers handling such cases, the great overlap in the law governing such
cases, and the similar incentives to sue and settle a claim.
24
Yet, I found, as Mike Selmi has contended, that courts treat cer-
tain types of employment discrimination cases differently.25 The re-
search in this Article was able to break down employment
discrimination cases not by statute (the approach of Clermont and
Schwab, which does not perfectly capture the type of discrimina-
tion) ,26 but by the type of discrimination alleged. From this, I found
that judges are dismissing more race cases on pretrial motions than
they are for gender discrimination cases. 27 This is so even though
gender cases were more likely to settle than race cases. Most surpris-
ingly, however, was the outcome in age discrimination cases, a finding
at odds with a common belief that age cases are easier to win. 28 The
23 Clermont & Schwab, supra note 2, at 445 (breaking down employment discrim-
ination claims by the following statutes: Title VII, ADA, § 1981, § 1983, ADEA, and
FMLA).
24 Perhaps, however, there is more stigma in being called a race discriminator
than a gender discriminator that would cause a defendant to be less likely to settle a
race claim. Then one would think that race cases decided by the judiciary would have
more merit than gender cases as defendants settle fewer cases and seek judicial ap-
proval of their challenged actions. The data is inconclusive as to whether this is true.
See infra Part II.C.2 (finding that race cases had lower rates of settlement and higher
pretrial judgment rates than gender cases).
25 See Selmi, supra note 2, at 562 ("The bias the courts bring to the cases varies by
the type of case.").
26 For example, the comparison for Clermont and Schwab included statutes such
as Title VIl and § 1983 that include more than one type of discrimination. See Cler-
mont & Schwab, supra note 2, at 445.
27 See infra Part II.C.2.
28 See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 2, at 564, 566 (arguing that age discrimination cases
"tend to fare the best in court, particularly before juries that can sympathize with the
plaintiffs given that all jurors are likely to become old," but also recognizing that
"[c]ourts have thus been inclined to craft rules that facilitate granting summary judg-
ment against age discrimination plaintiffs"). But see Clermont & Schwab, supra note
2, at 445 (including Age Discrimination in Employment claims as a separate category
to examine and finding no differences in how claims are treated).
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data from this study indicates that the outcomes in age discrimination
cases are very similar to the dismal outcomes in race discrimination.
29
Part III argues that the current state ofjudicial decisionmaking in
race and national origin cases evidences what I call an "anti-race plain-
tiff ideology." Judicial resolution of these cases is overwhelmingly via
a pretrial judgment where the judge must say as a matter of law rea-
sonable jurors could not find for the plaintiff.3 0 This demonstrates
not federal courts deferring to defendants, but judicial agreement with
defendants in race cases.3 1 This type of judicial decisionmaking is
quite different from public law litigation, where deference is a com-
mon decisionmaking tool. 32 For example, in school desegregation
cases courts explicitly state that they will defer to defendants, and then
judicially approve the defendants' positions after an evidentiary hear-
ing.3 3 The deference in school desegregation seems altogether differ-
ent from how courts approach their employment discrimination cases,
with their frequent pretrial resolution of questions and rare mention
of deference or the related value of employment at will. 34 Employ-
ment discrimination cases demonstrate not mere deference, but an
anti-race plaintiff ideology that largely validates defendants' version of
the challenged events.
35
I. THE ABSENCE OF THE WINNABLE LAWSUIT
Here I tell the story of the typical race and national origin em-
ployment discrimination lawsuit. Rather than focus on a handful of
opinions on a particular topic or on high profile litigation, I examine
the "sweep" of such cases to examine a broader array of claims. 36 My
original goal was to define plaintiffs' winnable cases. That goal
29 See infra Part II.C.3.
30 See infra Part III.B.1; notes 47, 49 and accompanying text.
31 See infra Part III.B.1.
32 By public law litigation, I mean "cases challenging the operation of public insti-
tutions, i.e., school desegregation, the rights of institutionalized persons, public hous-
ing discrimination, and voting rights." Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public
Law Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 479 n.13 (1999).
33 See Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School Desegregation, and Federal-
ism, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1691, 1705-45 (2004) [hereinafter Parker, Connecting];
Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School Desegregation and District
Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1644-52 (2003) [hereinafter Parker, Decline];
Parker, supra note 32, at 534-42.
34 See infra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
35 See infra Part III.A.
36 SeeJuliano & Schwab, supra note 9, at 592 ("[E]xamination of the sweep of
cases will provide useful antidotes to the tendency to generalize too far from a hand-
ful of cases.").
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proved elusive, and, as we'll see later, the chances of success for race
plaintiffs are even smaller than the current literature suggests, which
already demonstrates that employment discrimination plaintiffs lose
much more often than other plaintiffs.
37
Determining the current state of these cases in the federal district
courts necessarily leads to empirical work. This Part starts with the
"how" of the two empirical studies analyzed in this Article.38 It de-
scribes the methodology of the two studies and argues that the
breadth and depth of the studies provide a fairly complete picture of
most employment discrimination lawsuits filed on the basis of race. It
then describes the "who"-the plaintiffs and the defendants-of these
cases.39 Next, the "what" of these cases is described; here we learn
plaintiffs' very low chances of success when a court decides their
claim.40 Lastly, this Part turns to the "why" of those low chances of
success and demonstrates that plaintiffs almost always lose-regardless
of their status or their claims, the status or arguments of the defend-
ants, or the gender or race of the judges.
41
A. The How
This Part describes the methodology of the two studies presented
in this Article. Both concern race employment discrimination
claims, 42 but utilize different databases. One is a national study of 467
reported opinions (which I'll call the "national study"), and the other
examines 192 court filings from the Northern District of Texas or the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania (the "case filing study" for short).
This Part also argues that the reliance on both reported opinions and
case filings presents a very detailed, and important, picture of race
employment discrimination litigation.
1. The National Study
The national study evaluates 467 decisions of the federal district
courts issued in 2003 and available on Westlaw.43 All 467 opinions
37 See infra Parts I.B, III.A; supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
38 See infra Part I.A.
39 See infra Part I.B.
40 See infra Part I.C.
41 See infra Part I.D.
42 Again, I am frequently using the word "race" to include both race and national
origin claims. See supra note 7.
43 The opinions included in the national study were generated from the district
court database on Westlaw with the following search: "Title VII" "employment dis-
crimination" /p race ethnicity "national origin" & date (after 1/1/2003 & before
1/1/2004). This search produced 886 search results. The number of opinions gener-
2006]
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concern allegations of race and/or national origin discrimination 44
filed under Title VII,4 5 with Title VII substantive law governing
the resolution of the claim. 46 Further, the national study focuses
on the most common procedural posture and claim decided
by federal courts: pretrial motions47  on disparate treatment
ated from the search slowly increased over time, as Westlaw supplemented its
database. The last search was conducted on June 30, 2004, and produced 886 cases.
That list is available upon request.
44 I studied both race and national origin because of the conceptual overlap in
prohibiting race and ethnic discrimination-both seek to end discrimination based
on skin color and ancestry. This is not to suggest that the two are the same; the two,
in fact, are coded separately in this Article.
45 Title VII is the most commonly used basis to challenge employment discrimi-
nation due to race or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
46 Excluded from the study are the following issues: proper defendants, plaintiffs'
employee status, enforceability of arbitration clauses or settlement agreements, dis-
covery disputes, and preclusion issues. I personally made the decision as to whether
to include or exclude all opinions, and it is entirely possible that I excluded cases that
should have been included. This completely random occurrence, however, should
not affect the outcomes of the national study. See Schultz & Petterson, supra note 9, at
1089 n.45 ("Although our search was designed to locate all published decisions in
which a federal court addressed the lack of interest argument, we may not have lo-
cated every such case. Such a failure would raise no methodological problem, how-
ever, so long as the search strategy did not yield a biased selection of cases. There is
no reason to suspect any such bias.").
Because the study concerned the treatment by district court judges of Title VII
race plaintiffs, I also excluded magistrate judges' opinions that had not been adopted
or approved by a district court judge in the magistrate judge opinion found on
Westlaw.
Certain procedural postures were also excluded as having more to do with the
procedural standards than with Title VII substantive law. Excluded procedural pos-
tures included motions to dismiss because of improper service, motions to remand to
state court, motions to amend, and postjudgment motions for attorneys' fees and/or
costs. I also excluded two procedural postures because such motions so rarely suc-
ceed. I omitted opinions solely concerning plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
I also excluded motions to reconsider and Rule 60 motions because such rulings are
rarely granted and reflect more about stiff procedural burdens than Title VII substan-
tive issues.
Also, to the extent these types of excluded issues or procedural postures arose in
an opinion with an otherwise includable discussion (for example, a resolution of a
summary judgment motion on a failure to hire on Title VII substantive grounds), the
opinion was included in the national study, but the discussion of the excludable issues
and/or procedural postures was not coded.
47 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) (dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted); FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (judgment because no genuine issue of
material fact is in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law). In both instances, the court is saying as a matter of law that reasonable jurors
could not find for the plaintiff. For a motion to dismiss, a legal defect in plaintiffs'
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claims. 48 Employment discrimination cases rarely make it to trial, 4 9
and disparate impact claims are infrequent, although far from ex-
tinCt.50 I chose to study district courts simply because many more dis-
putes are resolved at the trial court level than at the appellate level
and because these cases represent more typical claims than appellate
decisions.
5 1
Two research assistants coded the opinions for sixty-one factors,
which focused on the claims and defenses asserted, along with out-
come data.52 Most opinions contained a final disposition of the
pleading exists. In the summary judgment context, plaintiffs cannot prove their cases
such that reasonable jurors could find in their favor. At neither posture is there an
evidentiary hearing. This study did not cover motions to dismiss on procedural
grounds such as improper service. See supra note 46 (discussing inclusion of opinions
in study).
48 In a disparate treatment claim, plaintiffs allege they were intentionally treated
differently because of their race or ethnicity, or any other covered characteristic. This
is frequently proven through the McDonnell Douglas test. See supra note 1 (setting
forth that test).
49 The Administrative Office has reported that 3.39% of employment discrimina-
tion cases were resolved by a trial. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 2, at 438-39.
This figure includes both jury and bench trials. See id. When analyzing the Westlaw
search results, I found only eight opinions that were not motions to dismiss and/or
motions for summary judgment, and that otherwise met the national study's criteria.
By contrast, 20% of employment discrimination cases are resolved by pretrial motion.
See id. at 444; see also Golmant, supra note 2, at 604 (reporting that from 1992 to 2000,
25% to 35% of cases were resolved by judgment at the pretrial stage, with a defendant
victory rate ranging from 85% to 95%).
50 I found only two opinions filed exclusively on disparate impact grounds that
otherwise met the national study's criteria, and the two opinions were excluded from
the study. Twenty opinions alleged both disparate treatment and disparate impact,
and these opinions were included in the study.
51 See Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment
Cases, 34 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 71, 100 (1999) ("Because the district courts are often
the last arbiter of a plaintiff's case, these cases are of particular importance."); Frank
B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1457, 1481
n.162 (2003) ("Trial judges tend to confront more 'easy cases,' with less ideological
contestation, than appellate judges do, and trial judges' decisions have less preceden-
tial impact. As a result, their opinions are somewhat less ideological than those of
appellate courts.").
52 A copy of the coding sheet is available upon request. The coding of the data
has strong internal consistency. After the research assistants coded the opinions, I
checked all the coding sheets for errors and corrected any errors detected. To ascer-
tain the consistency in the coding, the method was repeated for five percent of the
opinions. SeeJuliano & Schwab, supra note 9, at 556-59 (reporting a similar method
of checking the internal consistency of the data). The results of the double coding
are available upon request. Forty-eight out of sixty-one factors had perfect agreement
and only two factors had less than 92% agreement. Plaintiffs' occupation had a con-
sistency rate of 88%; the disposition of the defense of failure to comply with EEOC
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case. 53 For those that did not include the ultimate resolution, I ob-
tained a docket sheet from online databases maintained by the district
courts.
5 4
a. The Benefits and Limits of Reported Opinions
The national study contains only reported opinions-those either
published officially by the court or unofficially by Westlaw. 55 Re-
ported opinions play a critical role in the development of the law, and
empirical studies often examine them. 5 6 Yet, suspicion often greets
such studies.57 The concern is simply that reported opinions may be
procedural requirements, 82%. After the double coding, I rechecked the coding of
plaintiffs' occupation, and I changed a handful of the codes to improve the consis-
tency in coding.
53 In 128 opinions the plaintiff won in whole or in part; and in ten opinions the
defendant entirely won on the motion, but that motion did not address all of plain-
tiff's race and/or national origin claims. See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying
text; see also Wendy Parker, Technical Appendix-Reported Decisions National Data
[hereinafter Reported Decisions National Data], http://www.wfu.edu/-parkerwm/
Reported%20Decisions%2ONational%2OData%2OExcel.htm (last visited Apr. 1,
2006); Wendy Parker, Technical Appendix-Reported Decisions Plaintiff Wins Data
[hereinafter Reported Decisions Plaintiff Wins Data], http://www.wfu.edu/
-parkerwm/Reported%20Decisions%20Pi%2Wins%2OData%2OExcel.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 1, 2006). In 329 opinions, the defendant won on all of plaintiff's race and
national origin claims. See Reported Decisions National Data, supra.
54 See infra notes 68-69 for a description of this database.
55 See Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 10, at 1138 (defining published opin-
ions as those available on Lexis, even if not officially reported).
56 See, e.g., Colker, ADA Windfall, supra note 8; Colker, Winning and Losing, supra
note 8; Juliano & Schwab, supra note 9; Schultz & Petterson, supra note 9; David
Sherwyn, Michael Heise & ZevJ. Eigen, Don't Train Your Employees and Cancel Your"1-
800" Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Af
firmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FoP,HA.M L. REV. 1265, 1275 (2001)
(examining seventy-two summary judgment opinions on affirmative defense in sexual
harassment cases found on Lexis and Westlaw); Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Con-
stitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (2003) (ana-
lyzing 169 opinions on remittitur available on Westlaw).
57 The concern over studies of reported opinions is primarily one of overstating
the results of such studies because of a failure to recognize the limits of studying
reported opinions. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Out-
comes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 581, 588 (1998) ("[I]t is the case-selection effect-whereby the par-
ties' selection of the cases to litigate produces a biased sample from the mass of un-
derlying disputes-that causes the near-fatal ambiguity."); Clermont & Eisenberg,
Realities, supra note 2, at 125-26 ("[Published opinion studies are] a very risky under-
taking .... [I] t is tough to infer truths about the underlying mass of disputes or what
lies below disputes. On the other hand, published decisions are a skewed sample of
that tip of judicial decisions."); Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 10, at 1135
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an unrepresentative sample of lawsuits. The debate over studying re-
ported opinions is long-standing. My aim here is not to provide the
definitive answer to that debate (such a goal would be impossible),
but instead to agree with others who have contended that studies
based on reported opinions provide valuable insight into our legal
system and are worthwhile.
The Benefits. Studying reported opinions has two primary bene-
fits. First, while reported opinions fail to reveal eveything about our
judicial system, they reveal quite a bit.58 Reported opinions usually
tell us about the status of the plaintiffs and the nature of their claims,
the status of the defendants and the nature of their defenses, the rul-
ing in the case, along with the procedural posture and the reasoning
for the ruling. Further, the proliferation of electronic databases such
as Westlaw has expanded greatly the universe of reported opinions.
59
Eleven judicial districts, for example, make all of their opinions availa-
ble to Westlaw.60
Apart from the depth and availability of data in reported deci-
sions, a second benefit exists. Not only do reported opinions contain
a wealth of information, but that information matters. Lawyers,
judges, public policy experts, and lawmakers rely on reported opin-
ions.61 Officially published opinions, and sometimes unofficially pub-
("[C]ases with published opinions are systematically different from those without,
such sources and techniques need to be used with more caution than they have
been.").
58 SeeJuliano & Schwab, supra note 9, at 553 (noting that although differences
certainly exist, published opinions represent the "bulk of the issues and fact patterns
with which federal judges wrestle").
59 Westlaw includes in its database opinions officially reported, but also opinions
brought to its attention by judges and others. See Beiner, supra note 51, at 98 n.165
("Some cases are brought to [Westlaw's] attention by the courts themselves, and
others are brought to its attention by attorneys or researchers that find the case of
particular interest."); Ahmed E. Taha, Publish or Paris? Evidence of How Judges Allocate
Their Time, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 1, 4 (2004) ("On its own initiative West Group
sometimes acquires and publishes an opinion that is mentioned in legal periodicals,
suggested to West by attorneys or other judges, or cited by a judge in another
opinion.").
60 According to Westlaw's description of its district court database, the following
districts make all of their opinions available to Westlaw: Northern District of Califor-
nia, District of Columbia, Northern District of Illinois, District of Kansas, Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana, District of Massachusetts, Northern District of Mississippi, Eastern
District of New York, Southern District of New York, Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
and Northern District of Texas.
61 See Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know
How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1164 n.83 (1991) ("[W]hen
Congress debated recent civil rights legislation, studies of appellate opinions domi-
nated the empirical picture being drawn."); Michael Heise, The Importance of Being
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lished opinions, 62 serve as precedent for both lawyers and judges and
inform their ideas about the status of the law. Further, studies based
on all reported opinions-not just those reaching the popular press
such as multi-million dollar settlements for Home Depot and Tex-
aco 6 3 -will give a broader cross-section of race cases and thus better
inform public policy debates and proposed legal changes.
The Limits. Studies of reported opinions benefit from the poten-
tial of a broad scope: long periods of times, a multitude of factors, and
a wide geography are all feasible when studying reported opinions.
But the depth is not complete. Some types of disputes rarely make it
to the case filing stage and thus are necessarily excluded from a study
of reported opinions. Similarly, some types of claims make it to the
case filing stage, but not to the status of reported opinions. That is,
certain selection mechanisms come into play in getting a dispute to
the case filing stage and then from the case filing stage to the re-
ported opinion stage. For example, employment discrimination dis-
putes involving high wage earners are more likely to result in suits
filed andjudicial opinions reported than disputes including low wage
earners. 64 Thus, one should not conclude from reported opinions
Empirical 26 PEPP. L. REv. 807, 826 (1999) ("An important function of written pub-
lished judicial opinions is to shape future litigants' expectations and predictions
about what might happen if their case should proceed to trial. Moreover, these ex-
pectations and predictions in turn influence the nuanced decisional analyses about
whether to even initiate, let alone litigate, potential legal claims.");Juliano & Schwab,
supra note 9, at 592 (justifying the reliance on published opinions because it reveals
"the body of sexual harassment claims with which judges wrestle, from which they
form their world views, and upon which they develop the doctrine of sexual harass-
ment law"); Taha, supra note 59, at 2, 7 (reasoning that "the small percentage of
judges' decisions that are published are responsible for changes in law and for most
observers' perceptions of the federal court system" and that "published decisions are
more likely to be read and cited by the legal community").
62 On the differing precedential value of opinions unofficially reported, see Pene-
lope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56
STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1536-79 (2004).
63 For two interesting looks at high profile class action litigation, see Michael
Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination
Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1269-97 (examining the effects of em-
ployment discrimination class actions against Texaco, Home Depot, and Denny's);
Sturm, supra note 5, at 509-19 (describing class action gender discrimination suit
against Home Depot).
64 See Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 10, at 1154 ("As one would expect, man-
agement, professional, and technical workers-which are the high-wage job classifica-
tions-are more common in the published sample, while low-wage operatives are over
represented in the unpublished sample."); see also Clermont & Eisenberg, Realities,
supra note 2, at 140 ("The challenge is to tease out the residual meaning in win-rate
data by removing the inherent case-selection ambiguities-thereby isolating, say, the
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that employment discrimination claims are more likely to concern
high wage earners. Instead, these wage earners are simply over-
represented in the sample.
b. The Use of Reported Opinions
Given that reported opinions are not a perfect reflection of simi-
lar claims or case filings, but that the opinions provide a wealth of
accessible information, the question becomes how to utilize the data.
One can clearly make descriptive claims from reported opinions. The
more difficult question is how to interpret these results. Before inter-
preting the results, one must make sure that the results are not
skewed by factors that influence whether an opinion is reported or
not. Otherwise, one's interpretation of the data may be overstated or
wrong.6 5 In other words, the data from reported decisions need not
be perfect to be informative, but to be informative the data needs
careful treatment.
2. Case Filing Study
Even though reported opinions can give us "good ' 66 data, to pro-
vide as complete a picture as possible, I supplemented the national
remaining implications of the case-strength factor. That is, careful research and theo-
rizing can often succeed in overcoming the effect of settlement.").
65 Selection issues can be particularly acute at the district court level. Most em-
ployment discrimination cases settle without producing any reported opinion. Pre-
trial decisions are frequent and often brief, thereby reducing the opportunity for
writing an opinion deemed worthy of publication. SeeJuliano & Schwab, supra note 9,
at 556 n.39 ("Because district court opinions address claims at every stage of the pro-
ceeding and many of their ruling [sic] have little precedential value, district court
judges often choose not to officially report decisions."). By contrast, appellate courts
are more likely to write an opinion explaining the reasons for their decisions and to
publish their opinions than district courts. Publication policies and rates vary greatly,
however, among the circuit courts. See Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney,
Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54
VAND. L. Rv. 69, 86 (2001) (discovering the publication rates of circuit courts in
appeals from the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board); Pether, supra note
62, at 1567-79 (detailing the different publication practices of the circuit courts). No
one has undertaken a similar analysis of publication policies and rates among district
courts, where it is harder to define what could be published among the many deci-
sions made by district courts. Appellate courts, on the other hand, typically issue one
opinion per appeal, thereby making an easier definition of publication rates at the
appellate level.
66 See Clermont & Eisenberg, Realities, supra note 2, at 154 (concluding article
with a short statement of "[d]ata are good").
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study with the case filing study.67 This second study examined case
filings from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and Northern District
of Texas.68 This Part describes the methodology of this study of case
filings.
To select the cases, a research assistant searched an online
database maintained by the respective courts for all cases filed in the
year 2002 and identified with a case code of employment discrimina-
tion69 and a cause of action of a Title VII race or national origin
claim.7 0 From those criteria, the research assistant found eighty-two
67 See Schultz & Petterson, supra note 9, at 1092 ("In light of the possibility that
the decisions in our data set may be unrepresentative, we compare them to a second
data set comprised of a sample of closely-matched group of filed cases.").
68 Siegelman and Donohue studied these two districts, along with five others, in
their 1990 comparison of reported and unreported district court employment dis-
crimination opinions. See Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 10, at 1143. In that
study, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had the second highest percentage of
unique employment discrimination cases with published opinions (24.4%), while the
Northern District of Texas was the district with the second lowest percentage of
unique employment discrimination cases with published opinions (5.7%). See id.
Both districts also participate in Case Management & Electronic Case Filing system
(CM/ECF), an electronic database maintained by district courts that includes docket
sheets and selected case filings. Further, both districts included on the case summary
on CM/ECF for each case the type of discrimination alleged in the suit. See infra note
70. Lastly, both districts make all their opinions available to Westlaw, which thus pro-
vides good comparison possibilities with the national study. See supra note 60 and
accompanying text.
69 CM/ECF allows searches by case category and date complaint filed. Docket
sheets and some court filings can also be retrieved from the database. The particular
query run was the following: case filed fromJanuary 1, 2002, to December 31, 2002,
with Administrative Office case category of "Civil Rights: Jobs," the category for em-
ployment discrimination cases. This search produced 557 cases for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania and 401 cases for the Northern District of Texas. The coding of
cases by case category has been found to have high reliability. See Theodore Eisen-
berg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative Office of the US. Courts
Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1455, 1463 (2003)
("[T]he most basic code for researchers' use of AO data-the case category, which
identifies cases as pertaining to a specified subject matter-appears from the limited
research already done, to be highly accurate.").
70 This can be found on the case summary page provided for every case satisfying
the query. Included in the case filing study were cases identified with the cause of
action of "42:2000Job Discrimination (Race)," which loosely corresponds to Title VII
(42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)) claims that concern either race or national origin. No
case was described with a cause of action of "42:2000 Job Discrimination (National
Origin)"; it appears that national origin cases were coded as race claims. The com-
plaints and docket sheets collected also revealed national origin claims being coded
as race claims. It is entirely possible that the clerk would code a case as race discrimi-
nation and that the case be about another type of discrimination. I found no evi-
dence of this, however, in the docket sheets, which can sometimes be fairly descriptive
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cases for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and 110 cases for the
Northern District of Texas. For comparison purposes, I also collected
from the two districts data on 172 gender employment discrimination
cases and 109 age employment discrimination cases.7 1 Relying on
docket sheets, the cases were coded for nineteen factors, primarily fo-
cusing on the outcomes of various procedural stages.
The national and case filing studies were designed to be similar
in topic and time period.72 Yet, the case filing study utilized a broader
definition of court action than in the national study. The national
study relied only on opinions, while the case filing study examined any
judicial action reflected on a docket sheet. 73 Thus, the case filing
study captures a broader picture of the all procedural postures in-
volved in resolving a case, while the national study only examines the
procedural posture of a particular opinion but in great detail. To-
gether, the studies represent both the depth and breadth of race and
national origin employment discrimination cases. The remainder of
this Article discusses the resulting data from the two studies. Most of
of plaintiffs claims. Further, clerks have been found to have a high degree of accu-
racy in coding the overall case code and the same is very possible for coding the type
of discrimination. See Eisenberg & Schlanger, supra note 69, at 1463. Finally, I would
expect that the random occurrence of mislabeling the type of discrimination alleged
would not affect the overall conclusions of this Article.
71 See infra Tables A5 & A6. The cause of action on the case summary page, see
supra note 70, was for the gender cases "42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)" or
"42:2000Job Discrimination (Sexual Harassment)." See infra Part Il.C.2. Many thanks
to Joan Williams for encouraging this collection of data. The cause of action for the
age cases included "29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)"; "29:633 Job Discrimination
(Age)"; and "42:2000 Job Discrimination (Age)." See infra Part II.C.3.
72 The national study based on the Westlaw database and the court filings study
based on the CM/ECF database utilize different search engines, but the two are rela-
tively compatible. The main relevant difference in the two search engines is that
Westlaw allows searches by the date of the opinion, while CM/ECF allows searches by
date complaint filed or by last entry date on the docket sheet.
Although the data in the Westlaw study and the CM/ECF study need not match
up completely for the comparison of data to be informative, I attempted to have the
data be of the closest time frame available. To that end, the CM/ECF study included
cases in which the complaint was filed within the year 2002, while the Wesdaw in-
cluded all district court opinions published in 2003 in an effort to capture the most
recent year for which data would be available. Although a definitive study was not
conducted, the quick overview of the Westlaw database found many opinions where
the complaint was filed in 2002. Picking 2002 as the year of filing also allowed suffi-
cient time for the case to be terminated.
73 See Heise, supra note 61, at 825 n.105 ("I use the term 'judicial opinion' loosely
in this context. Courts generate an array of official workproduct (e.g., judicial orders,
memorandum, judgments, opinions).").
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the analyzed data can be found in the Appendix to this Article. The
data not in the Appendix can be accessed online.
74
B. The Who: Plaintffs and Defendants
This Part discusses the parties and their claims found in pub-
lished opinions.
75
1. The Plaintiffs and Their Claims
The national study of reported opinions revealed men (59%) su-
ing more often than women (39%), and at a rate higher than their
representation in the workforce. 76 The plaintiffs race or national ori-
gin was most often identified as African American or black (60%).
The next most common race or national origin was white, not of His-
panic origin (10%), followed by Hispanic plaintiffs in 8% of the opin-
ions.77 Plaintiffs' union membership was mentioned in 16% of the
cases, slightly more than the rate of unionized employers in the
workforce. 78 Plaintiffs typically worked in either blue collar (30%) or
"other white collar" fields (29%) (meaning not professional, clerical,
or technical, but other white color work such as teaching or manage-
ment) .79 The reported opinions included overwhelmingly suits with
74 See Wendy Parker, Technical Appendix [hereinafter Technical Appendix],
http://www.wfu.edu/-parkerwm (last visited Apr. 1, 2006). This Technical Appendix
includes all of the data for this Article in Excel format along with the coding sheets as
PDF files. The output files are in SPSS format.
75 Because of a possible case selection effect, see supra notes 57, 64-65 and accom-
panying text, the parties in published opinions likely do not mirror the parties in all
similar cases or disputes. Because existing scholarship tells us little about the average
party to a race or national origin claim, the data for published opinions adds some
knowledge, albeit limited knowledge.
76 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, TABLEI 1: EMPLOYMENT STA-
TUS OF THE CIVLIAN NONINSTITUTIONAL POPULATION BY AGE AND SEX, 2002 ANNUAL
AVERAGES, available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-tablesl.pdf. (identifying women as
making up 47% of the workforce, and men at 53%). In the remaining opinions, the
plaintiffs' gender was nonascertainable (one opinion, or 0.2%), or there were multi-
ple plaintiffs, with at least one female and one male (six opinions, or 1.3%). See infta
Table Al.
77 The plaintiff's race was Middle-Eastern descent in 3% of the opinions; Asian/
Pacific Islander, 3%; multi-racial individual or group, 2%; Native American, 1%; or
nonascertainable, 13%. See infra Table Al.
78 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, TABL 34: UNION AFFILIA-
TION OF EMPLOYED WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS BY SEX, ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1983-2002,
available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wif-tables34.pdf (reporting that 13% of those em-
ployed are represented by unions).
79 The representation of other occupations in the national study are as follows:
10% administrative, 8% clerical, 8% law enforcement/firefighter, and 3% technical.
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one plaintiff (94%), suing with attorney representation (80%),8 0 and
without any assistance from government agencies (99%),81 public in-
terest organizations (100%), or amicus filings (100%).182 In sum, the
most common plaintiff in a published opinion was an African Ameri-
can male, working in either blue collar or other white collar fields and
represented and assisted solely by a private attorney.
Surprising, given the attention they have recently received in the
literature, was the relatively small percentage of whites suing.83 Al-
though some have expressed concerns with white men using employ-
ment discrimination law, only 6% of the opinions had a white man as
a plaintiff.84 (Their win rate was less than the overall sample. 85 ) Also
particularly noteworthy is the complete absence of class actions, which
are given a fair amount of attention in the literature.
86
See infra Table Al. The occupation was nonascertainable in 13% of the opinions. See
infra Table Al. Compare these figures with those in Juliano & Schwab, supra note 9,
at 561 (reporting the following occupational breakdown in study of published deci-
sions on sexual harassment from 1986 to 1995: 12% professional, 29% clerical, 38%
blue collar, 21% management and white collar, and 10% nonascertainable).
80 Attorney representation was defined as whether the plaintiff was represented
by counsel at the time the opinion was written.
81 The small percentage of cases filed by the federal government (1%, or 3 cases
out of 467) is contrasted with the percentage of cases filed against the federal govern-
ment (15%, 68 out of 467). See infra Table Al. This is consistent with other studies.
See Schultz & Petterson, supra note 9, at 1146 ("While the level of government plain-
tiff participation decreased, the level of government defendant involvement increased
over time.").
82 Similar results were reported in a sexual harassment study. See Juliano &
Schwab, supra note 9, at 561-63 (finding less than 2% with any public interest involve-
ment, and less than 1% class actions).
83 See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARv. L. REv. 493, 517 (2003) (considering whether limiting disparate impact analysis
to minorities would violate the Equal Protection Clause); Charles A. Sullivan, Circling
Back to the Obvious: The Convergence of Traditional and Reverse Discrimination in Title VII
Proof 46 WM. & MARY L. RFv. 1031, 1034 (2004) (arguing that McDonnell Douglas
should no longer apply to either claims by minorities or whites); Charles A. Sullivan,
The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White Males, 98 Nw. U. L.
Rrv. 1505, 1512 (characterizing "the question of the sweep of disparate impact [as
having] important practical and theoretical implications").
84 Thirty cases had white men as plaintiffs (or 6%), while sixteen cases had white
women (or 3%). See Wendy Parker, Technical Appendix-Reported Decisions Fre-
quencies App A [hereinafter Reported Decisions Frequency App A], http://
www.wfu.edu/-parkerwm/Reported%20Decisions%20Frequencies%2OApp%20A.spo
(last visisted Apr. 1, 2006); see also Reported Decisions National Data, supra note 53.
85 The win rate of white males was 17.9%, compared to an overall win rate of
27.4%. See Reported Decisions Frequencies App A, supra note 84; see also Reported
Decisions National Data, supra note 53.
86 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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The most common type of claim was retaliation (51%).87 Other
common complaints included discharge (39%), harassment/hostile
work environment (37%),88 terms and conditions that are not pay-
related (32%), promotion (28%), and terms and conditions that are
pay-related (19%).89 Constructive discharge claims, which have also
been the subject of recent scholarship in the sexual harassment arena,
were uncommon. 90
2. The Defendants and Their Defenses
In the national study, plaintiffs sued private employers 51% of the
time, state or local governments 34% of the time, and the federal gov-
ernment 15% of the time.91 Defendants raised as a defense most
87 For a thorough analysis of the meaning and importance of retaliation claims,
see Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18 (2005).
88 The national database only included disparate treatment claims, see supra note
48 and accompanying text, which necessarily raises the question of how to define
harassment claims. Some define harassment claims as something different from dis-
parate treatment and disparate impact. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Title VI's Midlife
Crisis: The Case of Constructive Discharge, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 309, 342-43 (2004).
Because harassment claims arose frequently enough in reported opinions to be fairly
studied (37% of opinions included harassment claims), I included them in the na-
tional study, even though some might not classify harassment claims as disparate treat-
ment claims.
89 The remaining types of claims coded were all asserted in less than 10% of the
opinions: constructive discharge (8%), demotion (4%), failure to hire (4%), and fail-
ure to reinstate (1%). See infra Table Al.
90 See Chamallas, supra note 88, at 313 (arguing that in sexual harassment cases
"at the crux of the constructive discharge litigation is a question of attribution and
responsibility, rather than one of the proper characterization of the nature of the
action"); see also supra note 89 (reporting that 8% of the opinions claimed discrimina-
tion through constructive discharge).
91 In two cases (0.4%), plaintiffs sued both private employers and governments.
See infra Table Al. Compare this percentage with those in Juliano & Schwab,
supra note 9, at 563-64 (noting that in a sexual harassment study of published opin-
ions, the federal government was a defendant in 4% of opinions, and state or local
governments were defendants in 23% of opinions). Siegelman and Donohue found
in their 1990 study that governments were overrepresented as defendants in reported
opinions. See Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 10, at 1154 ("Similarly, if one looked
only at published cases, one would suspect that cases against utilities and government
employers were more common and cases brought in the service sector were less fre-
quent than they in fact are. The differences might be explained by a wage effect, in
that service jobs pay less and utility and (federal) government jobs pay more."). The
case filing study also indicated that government defendants may be overrepresented
in reported opinions. Compare infra Table Al (government defendants in 48% of
published opinions), with infra Table A3 (government defendants in 17% of cases
filed), and infra Table A4 (government defendants in 21% of cases filed). This differ-
ence, however, could be due to how court clerks code cases with government defend-
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often the failure to demonstrate a prima facie case (80%), but also
asserted frequently two other defenses: legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action (54%) and plaintiffs' fail-
ure to comply with EEOC requirements (43%).92
C. The What
At this point, I describe the overall win rates in the cases studied.
1. What Counts as a Win
Plaintiffs' victories are a rare event in employment discrimination
litigation, so I've defined plaintiffs' wins broadly to capture as many
cases as possible. For tried cases, whether by jury or bench, plaintiffs'
victories are the awarding of any relief, whether it be injunctive or
monetary. The quantity or quality of the relief was not evaluated to
deem the award a win. For pretrial motions, a win for plaintiffs in-
cluded any ruling in their favor, no matter how minor; a win for de-
fendants meant only a complete win on the motion. 93 Thus, if a
plaintiff lost on three arguments to dismiss for failure to comply with
EEOC rules, but won one such argument, then the plaintiff was coded
as winning on the defense of failure to comply with EEOC procedural
requirements.
94
The more difficult conceptual issue is how to define settlements.
Settlements do not fit neatly into the categories of win or loss. 95 They
almost always reflect some sort of compromise in claim. Plaintiffs may
be only getting a nominal amount or may be compromising their
claims significantly. On the other hand, it is difficult to define settle-
ments as a loss. Plaintiffs, after all, most likely received something in
exchange for foregoing the claim. Further complicating the picture is
ants, rather than a difference between published opinions and cases filed. See supra
notes 69-70.
92 See infra Table Al.
93 SeeJuliano & Schwab, supra note 9, at 569 ("We count the case as a 'win' for
the plaintiff if the court upheld the plaintiff's sexual harassment claim in whole or in
part.").
94 Such a ruling on a pretrial motion allows plaintiffs to proceed on at least part
of the case. See id. ("Many opinions arise from pretrial motions to dismiss the plain-
tiff's claim, after which a 'winning' plaintiff could face other motions to dismiss as
well as a trial on the merits, post-trial motions, and an appeal. Winning at an early
stage does not necessarily indicate an ultimate victory for the plaintiff, but losing an
early motion typically indicates an ultimate defeat.").
95 See Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 8, at 256 ("It is hard to categorize
settlements as pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant since plaintiffs typically settle for less
than they seek in litigation.").
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the limited data on settlement terms. And even if that information
were readily accessible, it would be difficult to evaluate objectively
whether the settlement represented a victory or a loss for the plaintiff.
For these reasons, a settlement can't be defined as either a win or a
loss. 9 6
To the extent this Article is concerned with how courts treat
cases, defining settlements is of importance to the extent settlements
affect the types of cases a court decides, an issue independent of
whether the settlement is defined as a win or loss. So here I don't put
settlements into a win or loss category, but into the category of a com-
promise of a claim. Plaintiffs and defendants are usually glad to have
the matter resolved, with plaintiffs typically pleased with some relief.
Yet, it is almost inconceivable that both parties' respective claims have
not been compromised in some sense.
2. Pretrial Win Rates
In the national study of reported opinions on pretrial motions,
plaintiffs won about one in four opinions.97 The win rate was higher
in the opinions addressing a motion to dismiss than when resolving a
motion for summary judgment.98
Other studies have found that reported opinions overstate plain-
tiffs' win rates. 99 This would suggest that plaintiffs would have a lower
win rate in unreported decisions than in published ones. Although
this may be true for tried cases, a comparison of data in the case filing
and reported decision studies demonstrates that reported opinions on
96 Either way, plaintiffs have had at least some opportunity to state their claims,
and the courts have had some involvement in the telling of the story. The availability
of a federal court forum certainly has value independent of the compromise settle-
ment plaintiffs receive for their claim. See generally Susan Sturm, Equality and the Forms
of Justice, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 51, 54 (2003) (describing the importance of courts in
"facilitating the elaboration and implementation of public law norms").
97 Plaintiffs' win rate in the national study was 27%. See infra Table Al. The final
trial outcome of these lawsuits can be found infra Table 2. When also asserting a
disparate impact claim, which only occurred in 4% of the opinions, plaintiffs won in
whole or part 15% of the time on the case. See infra Table Al.
98 Plaintiffs' win rate was 42% in the 74 motions to dismiss, and was 25% in the
393 motions for summary judgment. See infra Table Al.
99 See Colker, ADA Windfall, supra note 8, at 105 (concluding that "it appears that
reliance on publicly available opinions overstates plaintiffs' success rates both at trial
and on appeal"); Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 8, at 275 (finding that "pub-
lished decisions tend to be more'pro-plaintiff than unpublished decisions"); Siegel-
man & Donohue, supra note 10, at 1155 n.43 (reporting that published opinions
overstate plaintiffs' win rates for all nonsettled cases, when compared to unpublished
opinions).
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pretrial motions tend to understate plaintiffs' win rates on pretrial mo-
tions. In other words, defendants are more likely to win a pretrial
motion in a reported opinion than in an unreported opinion. The
following Table compares the win rates on motions to dismiss and mo-
tions for summary judgment in the opinions in the national study for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of
Texas and the cases in the case filing study, with the larger figures in
bold face.' 00
TABLE 1. COMPARISON OF WIN RATES ON PRETRAL MOTIONS:
CASE FILING STUDY AND NATIONAL STUDY
Eastern District of Northern District of
Pennsylvana Texas
Case National Case National
Study Study Study Study
% (N) % (N) % () % (N)
Motions to Dismiss-Plaintiffins 76% (13) 50% (3) 47% (9) 17% (1)Wins
Motions for Summary 67% (10) 46% (6) 23% (8) 43% (12)
Judgment-Plaintiff Wins
The overall numbers are obviously small, and a larger data set
may indicate a different result. Yet, the numbers are striking for the
large differences in win rates in reported decisions as compared with
those that are not reported. With the exception of the win rate on
motions for summary judgment in the Northern District of Texas, the
win rate for plaintiffs was much higher in the rulings in the case filing
study than in the opinions examined in the reported opinion study.
Although this is contrary to earlier studies, this should not be surpris-
ing for one key reason. When defendants win pretrial motions, the
case is usually being disposed of, which makes it more likely that there
100 To determine how representative the national study is of plaintiffs' win rates
on pretrial motions, one can compare those pretrial outcomes with the results in the
case filing study of all filed cases. But the comparison should not be one between the
overall national figures with the overall case filing results. As will be discussed later,
the case filing study and national study both demonstrated differences in how jurisdic-
tions treat their race and national origin employment cases. See infra Part II.C. Thus,
when comparing the national study with the case filing study to determine how repre-
sentative the national study is, it is important to dis-aggregate the national study data
by district court. For the case filing study, I only included motions decided by the
court. In other words, I omitted motions that were pending at the time this Article
went to press (only one such motion) and motions in which the case settled before
the court ruled.
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will be a reported opinion. 1° 1 A ruling for plaintiffs on defendants'
pretrial motion, on the other hand, disposes of no claim, or only part
of the claim, which decreases the possibility of an opinion with
enough detail and analysis to warrant publication.
3. Disposition Rates
The case filing study demonstrates that other than fairly routine
(and minor) discovery disputes and scheduling orders, the cases typi-
cally involved little judicial effort.10 2 Settlement was the most fre-
quent disposition. Of the 192 cases in the case filing study, 128 cases
settled (a settlement rate of 67%). 103 The settlement rate is less than
the settlement rate for all employment discrimination suits in the two
districts. 104 As we'll see, this settlement rate is also lower than the set-
tlement rate in gender cases.
10 5
Particularly disturbing are plaintiffs' chances of success outside of
settlement. Unsettled cases in the case filing study are far outside the
long-standing principle that predicts cases resolved by the judiciary
should generally be about evenly split between plaintiffs' and defend-
101 See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Fed-
eral Court System ?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 508 (1989); Marc A. Franklin, Suing Mediafor
Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 795, 799 n.ll; Marc A. Franklin,
Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
455, 464; Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1157, 1196
(2000); Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 10, at 1146; Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet
Revolution of Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1, 41 (1998).
102 For example, in the Northern District of Texas, over half of the cases (53%, or
fifty-eight cases) were disposed of with no motion to dismiss or motion for summary
judgment filed; 41% (or forty-five cases) had only one such motion. Only 7% (or
eight cases) had two of these motions. No case had three. See infra Table A4.
103 See infra Tables A3 & A4.
104 The settlement rate for race cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was
78%, see infra Table A3, compared to an 81% settlement rate for all employment
discrimination cases filed in that district. In the Northern District of Texas, the settle-
ment rate for race cases was 58%, see infra Table A4, compared to a 67% settlement
rate for all employment discrimination suits filed in the district. The settlement rates
for all employment discrimination claims comes from the Administrative Office. See
infra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing accessibility of Administrative Of-
fice data). The most recent year for which Administrative Office data is available is
2000. These figures are derived from cases filed under federal question jurisdiction.
See Selmi, supra note 2, at 559 n.16 (using federal question jurisdiction when research-
ing employment discrimination cases in the Administrative Office database). The
figures were not that different when all bases of jurisdiction were included.
105 See infra Part II.C.2.
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ants' wins. 10 6 Under this theory, plaintiffs should settle cases when
they have weak claims, and defendants should settle cases when they
have weak defenses. This idea, commonly called the Priest-Klein the-
ory after its original authors, 0 7 contends that cases that are not close
in merit are the ones that settle, 108 and that these cases in the "gray
zone" are the ones the judiciary resolves. 10 9 Wins here, according to
the theory, should "be evenly split between plaintiff victories and de-
fendant victories, or converge on a 50/50 outcome as the law becomes
clear and known." 10
In the case filing study the outcomes were far from evenly split.
Forty cases not only did not settle but were also resolved by the judici-
ary on the merits (i.e., ajudgment for the defendant was not based on
a problem with service or prosecution of the suit).l' Of these forty
cases, defendant won on the merits in thirty-nine cases and a plaintiff
won in only one case (a jury trial in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania). 1 12 In percentage terms, plaintiffs' win rate was 2.5%, com-
pared to defendants' win rate of 97.5%.113 Further, as we'll see later,
plaintiffs' win rate is still profoundly low, even if they have prevailed
106 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 588 (explaining that "even if the
legal criterion highly favors plaintiffs, as does strict liability, one should not observe a
plaintiff win rate well above 50%. Instead, case selection will leave for adjudication a
residue of unsettled cases exhibiting some nonextreme equilibrium win rate.").
107 See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Liti-
gation, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (addressing the relationship between litigated dis-
putes and those resolved through settlement).
108 See id. at 9-17 (describing the effect of parties' expectations on settlement ne-
gotiations and noting that settlements are more likely where one party has a powerful
case); see also Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations from the Fifty Percent Rule: A
Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 234
(1996) (noting Priest and Klein's observation that "the clear-cut cases will be more
likely to settle before trial"); Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical
Study of Predictors of Failure To Settle, 49 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 315, 322-23 (1999) (ex-
plaining that Priest and Klein's model "predicts that the close cases will be tried").
109 See Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and
Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1571 (1989).
110 See Parker, supra note 101, at 1196.
111 See infra Tables A3 & A4.
112 See infra Tables A3 & A4. In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, six cases were
resolved by a pretrial judgment in defendant's favor, three cases were resolved with a
jury trial in defendant's favor, and one case was resolved with ajury trial in plaintiff's
favor. See infra Table A3. In the Northern District of Texas, twenty-eight cases were
resolved by a pretrial judgment in defendant's favor, and two jury trials held in defen-
dant's favor. See infra Table A4.
113 The remaining twenty-four cases were either granted a stay because of a bank-
ruptcy petition, dismissed for failure to prosecute, dismissed for procedural reasons,
or were pending at the time this Article went to press. See infra Tables A3 & A4.
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on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.1 14 The
meaning of this deviation from the Priest-Klein theory of even out-
comes is discussed in the remainder of this Article.
D. The Why
Within these overall low win rates lurks the possibility that plain-
tiffs win more often a particular set of cases. For that reason, this Part
goes beyond the overall win/loss rates and asks, through two statistical
tests,'1 5 whether some cases are more likely to be won or lost in a way
that is statistically significant.11 6 The national study, with its depth of
information on each lawsuit, necessarily provides most of the data in
114 See infra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
115 The two tests used are a Pearson chi-square and binary logistic regression. A
Pearson chi-square test determines whether two observed values differ from their ex-
pected values and whether the difference is likely due to chance. See infra note 116
(explaining statistical significance). The Pearson chi-square tests herein all test
whether plaintiffs won or lost on the disparate treatment claim as compared to some
other single factor. In each of the Pearson chi-square tests, the total number of obser-
vations was greater than forty, and all the expected cell values were greater than or
equal to five. See Dale A. Nance, Comment on the Age Discrimination Example, 42
JURIMETRICS J. 341, 342 (2002) (identifying this as "one rule of thumb" for Pearson
chi-square tests). Also, the Pearson chi-square tests were two-tailed tests, which mea-
sure whether the mean of one distribution differs significantly from the mean of the
other distribution, regardless of the direction (positive or negative) of the difference.
See generally Robert Timothy Reagan, Reply to Comments on the Age Discrimination Exam-
ple, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 363, 367-68 (2002) (explaining the difference between one-
tailed and two-tailed tests).
A binary logistic regression test estimates the probability that an event will occur
given certain parameters. Unlike a Pearson chi-square test, a binary logistic regres-
sion test can test the effect of more than one variable on a dependent variable, which
is binary. Here the dependent variable was whether the plaintiffs or defendants won.
A defendant's win was coded as 0, and a plaintiff's win was coded as 1. The multiple
independent variables were then tested against the dependent variable. An odds ratio
greater than 1 indicates an increase in plaintiffs' chances for success when other fac-
tors are held constant. The odds ratio of the coefficient reflects the change in odds
that the event will occur given a unit increase in the independent value. See Clermont
&,Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 589. When a binary logistic regression includes inde-
pendent variables that are mutually exclusive, then one of the variables must be ex-
cluded for the regression (called the reference variable). See Colker, Winning and
Losing, supra note 8, at 267 n.69.
116 The statistical significance indicates the likelihood that a particular outcome
occurred by chance, and is expressed herein as a p value. Social scientists usually
define a p value of less than .05 as statistically significant. A p value of less than .10 is
typically defined as approaching significance. See generally Lee Epstein et al., The Norm
of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme
Court, 91 CAL. L. REv. 903, 912 n.41 (2003) ("The p-value indicates the exact level of
statistical significance. If the p-value is less that a threshold of Type I tolerable error
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this Part, although the case filing study is also relevant at certain
points. The data indicates that three factors strongly predict plain-
tiffs' chances for success in surviving defendants' pretrial motions: at-
torney representation, the procedural posture of the defendants'
motion, and the location of the district court.1 17 Yet, the factors ulti-
mately fail to explain fully plaintiffs' low win rates.' 1 8 In fact, I found
no evidence of a winning combination, from the standpoint of the
plaintiffs, of parties, legal positions, and judges.' 1 9
1. Pro Se Plaintiffs
Pro se plaintiffs lost more frequently than those represented by
counsel, and the higher loss rate was statistically significant.1 20 Find-
ing that attorney representation increases plaintiffs' chances of suc-
cess should not be controversial.1 21 The decision of an attorney to
accept the case, along with the attorney's efforts to win the case,
(typically 5%), then one can conclude that the relationship in the observed data is
not due to chance alone and is thus statistically significant.").
117 See infra Part I.D.1-3.
118 See infra Part I.D.1-3.
119 See infra Part I.D.1-5: see also infra Table A2.
120 In the national study, the win rate when plaintiffs were proceeding pro se was
16%; when not proceeding pro se, 30%. See infta Table Al. A Pearson chi-square test
found a p value of .009, which indicates statistical significance. The importance of
proceeding pro se was also evident in the binary logistic regression results. The odds
ratio was also high, at .452, indicating that pro se status decreased plaintiffs' chances
for success by 54.8%. This was statistically significant at the 1% level. See infra Table
A2.
The case filing study also indicated that plaintiffs were more likely to win and
more likely to settle if represented by counsel. For example, in the thirty-two pro se
cases in the Northern District of Texas, nine cases settled (a 28% settlement rate, as
compared to an overall settlement rate of 58%); twelve cases were involuntarily dis-
missed for failure to prosecute, and eleven cases were pretrial judgments in defend-
ants' favor (a 34% pretrial judgment rate, as compared to an overall pretrial
judgment rate of 26%). See Wendy Parker, Technical Appendix-ND Tex Race Fre-
quencies App D [hereinafter ND Tex Race Frequencies App D], http://
www.wfu.edu/-parkerwm/ND%20Tex%2ORace%2OFrequencies%2OApp%20D.spo
(last visited Apr. 1, 2006); infra Table A4. In the five pro se cases in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, one case settled (a 20% settlement rate, as compared to an
overall settlement rate of 78%), two cases were involuntarily dismissed for failure to
prosecute, and two cases were pretrial judgments in defendants' favor (a 40% pretrial
judgment rate, as compared to an overall pretrial judgment rate of 7%). See Wendy
Parker, Technical Appendix-ED Pa Race Frequencies App C [hereinafter ED Pa
Race Frequencies App C], http://www.wfu.edu/-parkerwm/ED%20Pa%20Race%20
Frequencies%20App%20C.spo (last visisted Apr. 1, 2006); infra Table A3.
121 See Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 8, at 266 ("It is common knowledge
that pro se plaintiffs are rarely successful in the appellate courts.").
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should indicate not only some merit to the claim but also increased
chances that the case will be competently litigated. 22 However, the
small number of pro se cases (20% in the national study,1 23 6% in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 12 4 and 29% in the Northern District
of Texas125) means that pro se status is not the only explanation for
plaintiffs' overall low win rates. In other words, one should not con-
clude that most employment discrimination cases are lost due to the
absence of attorney representation. In fact, the win rate in the na-
tional cases where plaintiffs have attorney representation is only 30%,
as compared to the overall win rate of 27%.126
2. Procedural Posture
Second, plaintiffs were more likely to win a motion to dismiss
than one for summary judgment, and the difference in win rates is
statistically significant. 127 As is true for the significance of pro se sta-
tus, plaintiffs' higher win rates in responding to a motion to dismiss
than to a summary judgment motion should not be surprising. The
standard for a motion to dismiss is very forgiving to plaintiffs.1 28 The
national study had the highest number of instances of motions to dis-
miss, but they occurred in only 16% of (or seventy-four) opinions.
For summary judgment opinions alone, plaintiffs' win rate of 25% was
not that much worse than the overall win rate of 27%.
3. Geographic Differences
A third important factor predicting success was the district court
issuing the opinion. For example, the Northern District of Texas
122 See Selmi, supra note 2, at 569-70 (arguing that the small number of pro se
employment discrimination cases means that most employment discrimination cases
have merit).
123 See infra Table Al.
124 See infra Table A3.
125 See infra Table A4.
126 See infra Table Al.
127 In the national study, plaintiffs' win rate for motions to dismiss was 42%; mo-
tions for summary judgment, 25%. See infra Table Al. A Pearson chi-square found a
p factor of .002. Likewise, the case filing study also revealed that plaintiffs are more
likely to win a motion to dismiss than a motion for summary judgment. In the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania, plaintiffs' win rate for motions to dismiss was 76%; mo-
tions for summary judgment, 67%. In the Northern District of Texas, plaintiffs' win
rate for motions to dismiss was 47%; motions for summary judgment, 23%. See infra
Tables A3 & A4; see also supra Table 1; supra note 100. As discussed earlier, reported
opinions tend to understate plaintiffs' win rates on pretrial motions. See supra notes
99-101 and accompanying text.
128 See supra note 47.
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awarded defendants their costs in 16% of the cases filed in the year
2002, while the Eastern District of Pennsylvania never awarded de-
fendants their costs. 129 The national study also demonstrated geo-
graphical differences. °3 0 Plaintiffs have much higher chances of
success in reported decisions in the district courts in the Second,
Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.
13 1
Yet, it would be wrong to identify at this stage particular courts as
more receptive to plaintiffs' claims. First, factors outside the court
room-the availability of lawyers, for example, given the impact of at-
torney representation on win rates132-may be influencing the out-
come, and not the district court itself. For example, in the case filing
study the Northern District of Texas had a much higher rate of pro se
plaintiffs than the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and this may better
explain the different disposition rates than the differences in the
court hearing the case. 133 Second, the national study likely suffers
from a geographical bias. Publication policies and rates differ mark-
edly by court.13 4 Some courts may be more likely to publish opinions
in plaintiffs' favor, while others less likely. As a result, not all courts
are equally represented in the national study, thus making it difficult
to draw conclusions about particular courts. Thus, while the case fil-
ing and national studies both raise the question of whether different
courts treat race cases differently, neither adequately answers the
question.
129 See infra Tables A3 & A4. Similarly, the Northern District of Texas was more
likely to award a pretrial judgment to defendant (26% of all cases in the district) than
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (7%). See infta Tables A3 & A4. Part of this dif-
ference is likely due to the higher percentage of pro se plaintiffs in the Northern
District of Texas. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
130 For example, not one plaintiff won in the thirteen opinions reported from the
Northern District of California, while the win rate for plaintiffs was 60% in the fifteen
opinions from the District of Connecticut. See infra Table Al.
131 For example, binary logistic regression results suggest that a plaintiff in a dis-
trict court in the Third Circuit is more than three times more likely to win (the odds
ratio is 3.143) than a plaintiff in the Fourth Circuit (the reference variable), and that
the increased win rate is statistically significant, with a p value of .044. See infra Table
A2.
132 See supra Part I.D.1.
133 The Pennsylvania district had a 6% pro se rate, see infra Table A3, compared to
the Texas district's 29% pro se rate, see infra Table A4.
134 See supra note 65 and accompanying text; see also infra Table Al (detailing the
inclusion rates in the national study by district court).
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4. Claims and Defenses
Defenses and claims asserted also had statistical significance at
times, but always with a very small impact on whether plaintiffs were
more likely to win.135 For example, plaintiffs alleging discrimination
in retaliation were less likely to win. 136 Yet, this had a minor effect on
plaintiffs' chances for a judicial win, having an overall impact of less
than 1%.137 In other words, plaintiffs bringing retaliation claims were
less than 1% more likely to lose. Other claims and defenses had statis-
tical significance, but again with an overall impact of less than 1%.138
With such small impacts on win rates, it is difficult to treat the factors
as determinative. By contrast, having an attorney increased plaintiffs'
chances of winning by 54%.139
5. Race and Gender of Judges
Apart from the claims and defenses asserted in a case is the race
and gender of the judge hearing the claims. Because reported deci-
sions fairly represent all opinions by the judge's race or gender,140 the
national study provides a good opportunity to test the relationship be-
135 See infra Table A2.
136 According to a binary logistic regression, the p value was .058, which is ap-
proaching statistical significance. See infra Table A2; see also supra note 116.
137 According to the results of a binary logistic regression, the odds ratio was .996,
indicating that alleging a retaliation claim decreases plaintiffs' chances of success by
only .04%. See infra Table A2.
138 See infra Table A2.
139 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
140 For example, my colleague Ahmed Taha examined 188 district court opinions
on the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See Taha, supra note
59, at 8. This restriction allowed him to control for the many different aspects of
opinions that can affect publication rates and to focus on the characteristics ofjudges
and their effect on publication rates. He studied which judges choose to publish
opinions-either by submitting the case for official publication by West, by submitting
the opinion to Westlaw, or by not protesting Westlaw's publication of their opinion.
See id. at 4. Ajudge's gender and race had no measurable effect on the official publi-
cation by West or on unofficial publication by Westlaw. See id. at 11 n.12 ("When I
include sex and race variables they are insignificant individually andjoinly."); see also
Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 10, at 1149 n.34 ("Although such variables as age,
experience, and self-esteem may influence the probability that a given judge produces
a published opinion in a given case, since cases are assigned randomly to judges, such
effects presumably wash out in larger samples and thus can be ignored."). Attributes
of judges that impact publication rates are unrelated to attributes studied here. See
Taha, supra note 59, at 25 ("These analyses found that, all else equal,judges who held
prior political positions, who received higher ABA ratings, who had lighter caseloads,
who had longer tenures, who struck down the guidelines, or who had a greater
chance of promotion were more likely to publish their decisions.").
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tween judges' race and gender and the outcome in race employment
discrimination cases. The national study indicated no statistical differ-
ence in how judges treated cases, based on the judges' race and gen-
der.14' This was true also when considering how judges treated
plaintiffs of their same race. 142 In sum, the race and gender of the
judge did not affect plaintiffs' chances for success, an outcome similar
to studies of other subject matters.
14 3
6. Summary
Perhaps others, particularly with larger databases, will be able to
identify for plaintiffs their winnable race and national origin law-
suit. 144 In the national study, the presence of many individual factors
indicated a win rate more than the overall win rate of 27% on the
141 The win rate in the fifteen opinions with an African American female judge
was 27%, which was not statistically significantly different from the win rate of other
judges (the p value under a Pearson chi-square was .412). The win rate in the eighty-
seven opinions with a white female judge was 31%, which was not statistically signifi-
cantly different from the win rate of other judges (the p value under a Pearson chi-
square was .401). The win rate in the 293 opinions with a white male judge was 27%,
which was not statistically significantly different from the win rate of other judges (the
p value under a Pearson chi-square was .779). See infra Table Al.
142 For example, reported opinions with white plaintiffs and white judges had an
overall win rate of 22%, as compared to a win rate of 21.7% in all the opinions with
white plaintiffs and other judges (the p value under a Pearson chi-square was .920).
Opinions with African American plaintiffs and African American judges had an over-
all win rate of 22%, as compared to a win rate of 26.7% in all the opinions with
African American plaintiffs and other judges (the p value under a Pearson chi-square
was .458). See Reported Decisions Frequency App A, supra note 84.
143 In criminal cases, reviews of the race of judges and their rulings found no
correlations, except for one study. See Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences of
the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study ofJudicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1377, 1459
(1998) (examining district court opinions on constitutionality of Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and concluding that "outcome votes of minority judges were not signifi-
cantly different, while the reasoning of those judges varied substantially"); id. at 1456
(finding that "[s] tudies of trial judges in the very context of criminal cases and crimi-
nal sentencing have uncovered very little variation in the behavior of judges based
upon race"). But see Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 61, at 1190 (finding in inten-
tional discrimination cases that having a black or female judge increased substantially
a plaintiff's chances of success, but that the increase was not statistically significant);
Selmi, supra note 2, at 571 ("Havingjudges who have experienced discrimination and
understand its subtle operation is likely to influence the decisionmaking process.").
144 See, e.g., Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 8, at 272 ("With a larger
database, it is possible that one might find that harassment claims correlated signifi-
cantly with lack of success on the part of a plaintiff.").
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pretrial motions, but occurred so infrequently that statistical signifi-
cance proved elusive. 14
5
But for now, after analyzing 467 reported opinions for sixty-one
factors and 192 case filings for nineteen matters, little evidence of
what helps plaintiffs win, other than the obvious, appears. Nor can
pro se status or procedural posture of motion to dismiss fully explain
the profoundly low win rates. Overall, neither factor is frequent. In
the national study, 80% of the opinions had plaintiff attorney repre-
sentation and 84% of the opinions responded to a defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment.
In sum, most plaintiffs will very likely come up empty handed
when the judiciary decides their claim. 146 At best, they may survive a
motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. But both stud-
ies indicate, as the next Part demonstrates, that passing this hurdle
neither increases the rate of settlement nor ultimate success when ap-
pearing before a judge.
1 47
145 Plaintiffs had higher win rates than their overall 27% win rate in opinions
when more than one plaintiff sued (37% plaintiffs' win rate); when plaintiffs were
Asian or Pacific Islander (39%) or of Middle Eastern descent (38%); when plaintiffs'
occupation was technical (36%); when plaintiffs claimed discrimination in demotion
(42%); and when the court mentioned plaintiffs' requests for punitive damages
(42%). See infra Table Al. On the other hand, plaintiffs had lower win rates than
their overall 27% win rate in cases when plaintiffs were white and not of Hispanic
origin (22%); when plaintiffs' occupation was clerical (19%); when plaintiffs alleged
disparate impact and disparate treatment (15%); and when plaintiffs alleged failure
to hire (17%). See infra Table Al.
Yet, none of these deviations-whether more or less than the overall win rate-
was statistically significant. The number of observations, even in a study of 467 opin-
ions, was too infrequent to demonstrate that the outcome was not due to chance,
rather than to the characteristic itself. For all the factors noted above, the number of
observations in which the factor was present in an opinion was never more than forty-
six. Plaintiffs were white, not of Hispanic origin in forty-six cases; more than one
plaintiff, twenty-seven; Asian or Pacific Islander, thirteen; Middle Eastern descent, six-
teen; clerical occupation, thirty-seven; technical occupation, fourteen; plaintiff al-
leged both disparate impact and disparate treatment, twenty; plaintiff alleged failure
to hire, eighteen; plaintiff alleged demotion discrimination, nineteen; and opinion
mentioned punitive damages request, thirty-three. See infra Table Al. Yet, these qual-
ities should be noted as potential influences on the outcome of a pretrial motion.
146 See Colker, ADA Windfall, supra note 8, at 110 (questioning whether plaintiffs'
low win rates in ADA cases are explained by "plaintiff lawyers [who] are generally
aware of the trends in this area, but [who do not] believe they apply to the individual
case they are litigating").
147 See infra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
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II. POSSIBLE RACE NEUTRAL EXPLANATIONS
This Part examines two competing theories, both race neutral, to
explain plaintiffs' low win rates. One argues that cases with the slight-
est merit settle, leaving only the weakest claims for judicial resolu-
tion. 148 I'll call this the "defendants' settlement incentives" theory.
Under this theory, the low win rate simply reflects defendants' strong
incentives to settle and the resulting weakness of the claims coming
before the courts. The other contends that the low win rate is due to
a failure in the judiciary's evaluative function-specifically, that the
judiciary cannot redress subtle discrimination and/or defers too read-
ily to defendants' explanations of the challenged employment prac-
tice. 149 While both approaches, which are not mutually exclusive,
have validity, I argue that they fail to explain fully judicial
decisionmaking.
A. Do All the Good Cases Settle?
According to the defendants' settlement incentives theory, plain-
tiffs alleging race discrimination in employment fare poorly when
before federal district courts because their claims are weak. 150 Under
this argument, the defendants act on strong incentives to settle meri-
torious and even somewhat meritorious lawsuits. Defendants fear a
trial, with its unpredictable outcome, and a public airing of their af-
fairs. As a result, this theory contends, only particularly weak claims
remain for federal court resolution, and this best explains plaintiffs'
low win rate.
Although defendants rarely welcome the label of discriminator-
and this may be particularly true for race discrimination-I believe
the defendants' incentive theory is too simplistic to explain adequately
148 See infra Part II.A.
149 See infra Part II.B.
150 See Ruth Colker, Empirical Studies: How Do Discrimination Cases Fare in Court?
Proceedings of the 2003 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Section on
Employment Discrimination, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'YJ. 533, 536 (2003) (noting that
many interpret low win rates under the ADA as a result of the "good cases" being
resolved by the EEOC); Schultz & Petterson, supra note 9, at 1106-07 (noting that "a
number of commentators have suggested that employers have greater stakes than
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases in general"); Peter Siegelman &JohnJ.
Donohue III, The Selection of Employment Discrimination Disputes for Litigation: Using Busi-
ness Cycle Effects To Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 428 (1995)
(contending that "the party with more at stake will have the higher win rate"); see also
Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 95, 98-103 (1974) (arguing that repeat players will have a
higher win rate).
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such profoundly low win rates. 15 1 Of the 192 race and national origin
employment discrimination cases filed in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania and the Northern District of Texas in 2002, only one plaintiff
won when a court was the decisionmaker (and this was a jury trial).
1 5 2
In the national opinion study, 381 of the 464 unique cases did not
settle and were decided by the judiciary on the merits. 153 Plaintiff
won only five of the 381, all of which were jury trials.15 4 I'm doubtful
that defendants have strong enough settlement incentives to explain
such lopsided outcomes. Instead the outcome rates might indicate
the opposite. Shouldn't plaintiffs have higher incentives to settle than
defendants given their meager chances of success outside of settle-
ment? Perhaps it is plaintiffs instead of defendants who have an over-
whelming desire to settle, and are willing to compromise their claims
significantly to do so. Moreover, one could easily question whether
defendants have such a strong desire to settle given their overwhelm-
ingly high win rates in unsettled cases.
155
Further, if defendants had such a strong incentive to settle, leav-
ing only cases with the barest possibility of success, then one would
expect that the rate of settlement in cases in which plaintiffs prevailed
on pretrial substantive motions to be higher than in all cases. When
151 See Clermont, Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 2, at 566 ("Moreover, even as-
suming that plaintiff-defendant differences explain the anti-plaintiff pattern seen on
appeal in other case categories, employment-discrimination cases stand out so sharply
in this regard that one simply has to resort in part to an attitudinal explanation.... In
sum, rather than yielding to the intuitive appeal of the view that employment-discrimi-
nation plaintiffs are overly litigious, we tentatively conclude that appellate judges are
acting as if it is they who accept that view.").
152 This was a jury trial in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. By contrast, de-
fendants won thirty-nine times (97% of the time) when the court decided the case on
its merits. See supra note 112 and accompanying text; see also infra Tables A3 & A4.
153 In 329 opinions for 329 unique cases, the defendant won entirely on the pre-
trial motion and judgment was entered in defendants' favor. In 138 opinions for 135
unique cases, all or part of plaintiffs' race case remained. Of those 135 cases, seventy-
one cases settled, two were dismissed for failure to prosecute, see infra Table 2 (dis-
cussing the ultimate outcome in 125 cases in which the plaintiff prevailed in a pub-
lished opinion), and ten were pending or were unknown in outcome when this
Article went to press, see infra note 158 (detailing the outcome in ten cases in which
the defendant prevailed entirely in a published opinion, but part of the plaintiff's
race case remained). The remaining fifty-two cases were judicially resolved on their
merits. See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text; see also Reported Decisions
National Data, supra note 53; Reported Decisions Plaintiff Wins Data, supra note 53.
154 See infra Table 2; infra note 158 and accompanying text.
155 See Oppenheimer, supra note 10, at 565 ("And the suggestion that employers
fear ruinous race discrimination verdicts is belied by the fact that so few of the em-
ployment discrimination cases filed and tried are race cases, and the fact that African
Americans so rarely win such cases.").
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plaintiffs have won pretrial motions, particularly ones for summary
judgment, the court has granted at least some merit to plaintiffs' ver-
sion of events, and the defendants' settlement incentives theory would
strongly predict an eventual settlement.
Yet, both the national and case filing studies found that the rate
of settlement was lower in cases in which plaintiffs prevailed on pretrial
substantive motions. In the national study, plaintiffs won in whole or
part in 128 opinions, all of which left unknown the ultimate disposi-
tion of the claims. 156 Taking into account three cases with two re-
ported opinions in plaintiffs' favor, this left 125 unique cases.' 57 The
following Table describes the final outcome of the claim at the trial
court level, considering all 125 cases together and also dividing these
cases into times when plaintiffs won a motion to dismiss or a motion
for summary judgment in a published opinion.
TABLE 2. PLAINTIFFS WON IN NATIONAL STUDY OPINION:
FINAL TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION
Motion for
All Pretrial Motion to Dismiss Summary
Disposition Plaintiff Wins Plaintiff Wins Judgment
% (N) % (A) Plaintiff Wins
% (N)
Settlement 54% (68) 41% (14) 59% (54)
Dismissal-Failure to 1% (1) 0% (0) 1% (1)
Prosecute
Judgment for Plaintiff- 3% (4)* 0% (0) 4% (4)
Trial
Judgment forjdfenat-rial 18% (23) 44% (15) 9% (8)Defendant-Pretrial
Judgment forjdfenat-ri 15% (19)t 3% (1) 20% (18)Defendant-Trial
Pending/UnknownJ 8% (10) 12% (4) 7% (6)
Total 100% (125) 100% (34) 100% (91)
* All four were jury trials.
t This included thirteen jury trials and six bench trials.
* For three cases, I was unable to locate the docket sheet. Seven cases were
pending at the time of publication.
156 See infra Table Al.
157 I used docket sheets, which are increasingly available online through CM/ECF
and other online databases, to ascertain the disposition at the trial court level of the
opinions in which plaintiffs won. See supra notes 68-69 (discussing CM/ECF).
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The figures are surprising in two ways: the settlement rates and
the final disposition rates.158 If defendants have very strong incentives
to settle, even relatively weak claims, then the cases where plaintiffs
have prevailed in a substantive pretrial motion should have higher set-
tlement rates than in all cases. Then a court has deemed at least part
of plaintiffs' claim with some merit, and this would suggest that de-
fendants would then have a strong incentive to settle. Yet, the settle-
ment rates-54% for all opinions with plaintiffs' win; 41% for
opinions with plaintiffs' wins on a motion for dismissal; and 59% for
opinions with plaintiffs' wins on a motion for summary judgment-
are all less than the national settlement rate of all employment dis-
crimination cases (67%)1 59 and less than the settlement rate of race
and national origin claims in the case filing study (also 67%).160 De-
fendants are choosing not to settle as many cases in which the plain-
tiffs have prevailed on at least one pretrial motion. The defendants'
incentives theory would have predicted otherwise.
Similarly, in the case filing study, settlement rates were lower in
cases in which plaintiffs prevailed in a pretrial motion than the settle-
ment rates for all the race and national origin cases in the districts. In
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the settlement rate in cases in
which plaintiffs won on a pretrial motion was 68%, compared to a
158 In ten opinions, the defendant won entirely on the pending motion, but part
of plaintiffs' race case remained. In those ten cases, defendants were awarded pretrial
judgments in five cases; three cases settled; one plaintiff won ajury trial; and one case
was dismissed for failure to prosecute. See Reported Decisions National Data, supra
note 53; Reported Decisions Plaintiff Wins Data, supra note 53.
159 This figure is from Administrative Office data for the fiscal year 2000, the most
recent available year. The Administrative Office database can be accessed at http://
teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questata.htm, a web site maintained by Cornell Law
School. The settlement rate for employment discrimination cases is lower when com-
pared to all nonemployment discrimination cases. See Clermont & Schwab, supra
note 2, at 442 (finding lower plaintiffs' win rates in employment discrimination cases
than in all other types of cases). Race cases in the case filing study also had a lower
settlement rate than all employment discrimination cases in the studied districts. See
supra note 104 and accompanying text.
Granted, the comparison of settlement rates in opinions in which plaintiffs won
on a race and national origin claim to settlement rates of all employment discrimina-
tion cases is not perfect. Yet, the comparison still calls into question why cases with a
published plaintiff win have a lower settlement rate than all employment discrimina-
tion cases. The comparison also indicates that not all the "good" race and national
origin cases settle. After all, even when plaintiffs defeat defendants' summary judg-
ment motion, only a little over half of such cases settle. Further, this decreased settle-
ment rate is also reflected in the case filing study. See infra notes 161-62 and
accompanying text.
160 See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text; see also infra Tables A3 & A4.
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settlement rate of 78% in all the district's race cases examined. 161 In
the Northern District of Texas, the settlement rates were about the
same. The settlement rate in cases in which plaintiffs won on a pre-
trial motion was 59%, about the same rate of settlement found in all
the district's race and national origin cases (58%).162 By any measure,
plaintiffs who prevail in reported decisions or in unreported decisions
should not expect a greater chance of settling their case. Instead, de-
fendants appear to be litigating claims, not settling them, when they
think they have a good chance of winning.
In a 1990 study comparing cases with reported opinions to those
without reported opinions, Peter Siegelman and John Donohue ar-
gued that cases with reported opinions are less likely to settle because
the cases are more complex and novel than cases without reported
opinions. 163 This would suggest that the low settlement rate for the
national study of reported opinions in which plaintiffs won a pretrial
motion indicates not defendants' unwillingness to settle strong claims,
but instead merely reflects the cases' difficulty.
Yet, that explanation fails in this instance. Complex and novel
cases are also more likely to produce fairly even win rates for plaintiffs
and defendants. 164 These cases are by their nature ambiguous and in
the "gray zone" for which even outcomes are expected. But the dispo-
sition of the national study of reported opinions with plaintiffs' wins
are far from a predicted 50/50 win rate. When a plaintiff won in a
published opinion and did not settle, the judicial win rates 165 for the
ultimate disposition of the case were only 9% for plaintiffs but 91%
for defendants. 166 This win/loss rate is similar to that in the case fil-
ing study of all filed cases for a particular year. In the case filing study,
the win rates for cases without a settlement (and counting only dispo-
sitions based on the merits) was 3% for plaintiffs and 97% for defend-
161 See ED Pa Race Frequencies App C, supra note 120; infra Table A3.
162 See ND Tex Race Frequencies App D, supra note 120; infra Table A4.
163 See Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 10, at 1154-55; see also id. at 1141 n.23
("Because judges are less likely to write opinions that only address clear or settled
legal issues, complexity and changes in law should generate more written decisions.").
164 See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text; see also Siegelman & Donohue,
supra note 10, at 1148 (finding that "published decisions will be more prevalent
among the cases in which the stakes between the parties are equal").
165 Here I include the cases the district court decided on the merits, thereby omit-
ting the one case dismissed for failure to prosecute and the ten cases that were pend-
ing or whose outcome was unknown at the time this Article went to press. See supra
Table 2.
166 Forty-six cases did not settle and were decided on the merits by the time this
Article went to press. Plaintiffs won four of the cases; defendants, forty-two. See supra
Table 2.
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ants. 16 7 Thus, I am doubtful that the relatively low settlement rate is a
reflection of the complexity of the case, and these extremely lopsided
win rates ultimately undercut the defendants' settlement incentives
theory.1 6 8 After reading all 467 opinions, I also question whether any
opinion include-d what could be deemed a "novel" issue in Title VII
law. They all appear to be run-of-the-mill employment discrimination
disputes.
B. Is the Judiciary's Evaluative Function Failing?
Other possible race neutral explanations of plaintiffs' low win
rates would be failures in thejudiciary's evaluative function. This Part
considers specifically two possible errors as explaining plaintiffs' low
win rates-the judiciary's failure to redress subtle discrimination and
the judiciary's excessive deference to employers.1 69 Both errors have
equal applicability, in theory, to all types of employment discrimina-
tion, and in fact both have generally been applied in the literature
without regard to the type of discrimination alleged.
1. Subtle Discrimination
As others have documented well, judicial decisionmaking seems
currently unable to redress the subtle, systemwide discrimination that
is more prevalent today than overt discrimination by a single decision-
maker.170 Susan Sturm labels this later type of discrimination as "sec-
ond generation" discrimination.' 7 1 Her description of such discrimi-
nation is a good one: the "complexity [of second generation
discrimination] lies in the multiple conceptions and causes of the
harm, the interactive and contextual character of the injury, the blur-
riness of the boundaries between legitimate and wrongful conduct,
and the structural and interactive requirements of an effective rem-
edy." 172 She gives as an example a glass ceiling at a large law firm that
can "be discernible only if examined in context and in relation to
broader patterns of conduct and access.' 73 Today's litigation often
167 That is, forty cases did not settle and were decided on the merits by the time
this Article went to press. Plaintiff won one (a jury trial in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania) and defendants won thirty-nine. See supra notes 111-13 and accompa-
nying text; infra Tables A3 & A4.
168 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 5-6 for citations to the scholarship.
170 See supra note 5 for citations to the key scholarship.
171 See Sturm, supra note 5, at 460, 468-74.
172 Id. at 469.
173 Id. at 471.
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involves issues surrounding less obvious discrimination, but this is
likely not a new phenomenon. As Chad Derum and Karen Engle have
demonstrated, lawmakers and judges have long recognized the exis-
tence of subtle discrimination, although our understanding has cer-
tainly matured.
174
2. Deference to Defendants and Commitment to Employment
at Will
Many scholars have also identified judges as too deferential to
employment discrimination defendants. 175 For example, Sturm notes
that "[s]ome courts have deferred to an employer's procedures, re-
gardless of their actual effectiveness in eliminating identified
problems of harassment or discrimination. Deference may stem from
a judicial reluctance to impose a specific code that dictates the fea-
tures of an internal process to employers."1 76 Dernm and Engle rec-
ognize deference as well, and make an important contribution in
explaining that judicial commitment to the "employment at will" doc-
trine contributes to the deference. 177 The two argue that "[t]he em-
ployment at will doctrine-the background rule against which Title
VII was enacted that permits employers to make hiring and firing de-
cisions for good reasons, bad reasons, or no reason at all-is making a
comeback within the doctrine of employment discrimination law." 178
According to Derum and Engle, a commitment to employment at will
manifests itself, in part, when "many judges quite consciously and de-
liberately believe that, even under Title VII, they should not interro-
gate the practices of the private workplace without direct evidence of
mendacity." 179
In theory, both of these critiques of the judiciary's evaluative
function have equal applicability to all forms of discrimination.
Whether the plaintiff alleges discrimination in age, gender, or race,
courts can fail to identify subtle discrimination and can defer to de-
fendants. In other words, the explanations are race neutral by their
terms. Yet, as the next Part demonstrates, I found a difference in dis-
position rates by type of discrimination alleged. 180 The difference
174 See Derum & Engle, supra note 5, at 1196-1209. It thus may not be accurate to
describe "unconscious bias [as] 'second generation,' or a phenomenon that was not
known or understood in the 1960s." Id. at 1192.
175 See supra note 6 for citations to the key scholarship.
176 See Sturm, supra note 5, at 537-38 (footnote omitted).
177 See Derum & Engle, supra note 5, at 1236-41.
178 See id. at 1182.
179 See id. at 1193.
180 See infra Part II.C.
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suggests that something other than theoretically race neutral explana-
tions might be at play.
C. Comparisons to Race
Here I analyze whether employment discrimination cases are
treated similarly. Empirical research by Clermont and Schwab has in-
dicated that "pretrial and trial win rates are similar across types of dis-
crimination cases."18' In reaching this conclusion, they divided cases
according to the statutory basis for the claim, which will necessarily
lead to some overlap in the specific type of discrimination alleged. 18
2
Selmi has suggested otherwise, that courts treat different cases differ-
ently. He has proposed that "[t]he bias the courts bring to the cases
varies by the type of case." 183 In doing so, he extends the literature on
unconscious bias beyond the job site to the courthouse.' 84 Here I dis-
cuss empirical evidence supporting Selmi's argument that race cases
are treated differently than other types of discrimination. I specifi-
cally found that race cases are treated worse than gender cases. 185
This suggests the incompleteness of race neutral explanations of what
is underlying plaintiffs' low win rate. I also found evidence that age
discrimination cases suffer about the same fate as race cases, which
indicates that the current perception of age cases as one of the more
easy types of cases to win may not be accurate. 18 6
1. Juliano and Schwab's 2001 Study of Sexual Harassment
Juliano and Schwab's study of sexual harassment opinions shares
much in common with the national study-both rely on district court
opinions published by Westlaw and both are coded for similar fac-
tors. 18 7 Yet, the win rates were remarkably different. In the sexual
harassment study of district court opinions on pretrial motions, plain-
181 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 2, at 445 (breaking down employment dis-
crimination claims by the following statutes: Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005); Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2654; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to e-17; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213).
182 For example, one of the categories studied was Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, a statute covering different types of discrimination. Title VII covers race, sex,
color, religion, and national origin. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to e-17.
183 Selmi, supra note 2, at 562.
184 See id. at 561-62.
185 See infra Part II.C.1-2.
186 See infra Part II.C.3.
187 SeeJuliano & Schwab, supra note 9, at 560-72.
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tiffs won 53% of the time.188 By comparison, the national study's look
at 467 opinions demonstrated an overall win rate for plaintiffs of
27%.189 Even more surprising is that the majority of the cases in the
sexual harassment study were not covered by the Civil Rights Act of
1991,190 which Juliano and Schwab found to have a profound and sig-
nificant. positive impact on plaintiffs' chances for success.' 91 All the
opinions in the national study, on the other hand, were covered by
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The difference in outcomes may be a
factor of time. Juliano and Schwab's study covered the years
1986-1996192 and the national study was of the year 2003; 193 perhaps
things have gotten worse with time. Yet, the case filing study also indi-
cated that gender discrimination cases are easier for plaintiffs to win
than race discrimination cases, as the next section demonstrates.
2. Gender Filings in Pennsylvania and Texas
Case filings in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the North-
ern District of Texas also indicate differences in outcomes between
gender and race cases. 194 The following Table compares settlement
and pretrial judgment rates in gender and race cases (trial data was
too infrequent to study) 195 with the larger numbers bolded:
188 Id. at 570. Vivian Burger examined summaryjudgment dispositions in the dis-
trict courts of the Second Circuit available on Westlaw. That work also demonstrated
that plaintiffs were more likely to survive a summary judgment motion when claiming
sex discrimination rather than race or age discrimination. See Vivian Berger et al.,
Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23
HOFsTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45 (forthcoming 2006). She attributes the difference to the
inclusion of sexual harassment cases in her database.
189 See supra note 97 and accompanying text; see also infra Table Al.
190 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
191 SeeJuliano & Schwab, supra note 9, at 597 (finding a plaintiffs' win rate of
84.8% in the thirty-three opinions in which the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applied).
192 See id. at 550.
193 See supra note 43.
194 The collection of these cases is discussed supra notes 69-71 and accompanying
text.
195 For example, in the case filing study, only five trials were held for the 192 cases
filed in the year 2002. See infra Tables A3 & A4; see also supra note 49 (detailing
national trial rates for employment discrimination cases).
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TABLE 3. COMPARISON OF DISPOSITION RATES:
CASE FILING STUDY OF GENDER AND RACE DISCRIMINATION
I Eastern District of Northern District of
Pennsylvana Texas
Gender Race Gender Race
% (8) % (6) % (5) % (6)
Settlement Rates 87% (87) 78% (64) 72% (52) 58% (64)
Defendant Pretrial Judgment 6% (6) 7% (6) 14% (10) 26% (28)
Although it is more pronounced in Texas than in Pennsylvania,
both districts present the same pattern: that gender cases are more
likely to settle and defendants in gender cases are less likely to win a
pretrial judgment than in race cases. This difference indicates that
plaintiffs alleging race discrimination face higher odds when pursuing
their claims in federal court than plaintiffs claiming gender
discrimination.
3. Age Filings in Pennsylvania and Texas
Also notable are the settlement rates and pretrial judgment rates
in age cases. The following Table compares settlement and pretrial
judgment rates in age and race cases (again, trial data was too infre-
quent to study), with the larger numbers bolded:
TABLE 4. COMPARISON OF DISPOSITION RATES:
CASE FILING STUDY OF AGE AND RACE DISCRIMINATION
Eastern District of Northern District of
Pennsylvana Texas
Age Race Age Race
% (N) % (M % (N) ____
Settlement Rates 78% (60) 78% (64) 53% (17) 58% (64)
Defendant Pretrial Judgment 17% (13) 7% (6) 22% (7) 26% (28)
Age discrimination cases appear to be much harder to win (and
settle) than previously proposed.1 96 Their settlement and defendant
pretrial judgment rates are very similar to the race cases. This indi-
cates that the current perception of age cases as easier to win than
196 See George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The Expanding Scope of Employment Dis-
crimination Law, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 509 (1995) ("By every measure, plaintiffs in
ADEA cases are better off than plaintiffs in other employment discrimination cases.");
see also supra note 28.
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other discrimination claims may undervalue the biases that judges
bring to these cases.
4. Summary
The critiques of the judiciary's evaluative function apply, in the-
ory, equally across the many types of employment discrimination
claims. Yet, Colker has demonstrated incredibly low win rates for disa-
bility plaintiffs, 197 and this Article indicates that race and national ori-
gin plaintiffs also fare worse than gender plaintiffs and employment
discrimination plaintiffs in general.198 This difference in treatment
suggests that errors in the judiciary's evaluative function cannot fully
explain these cases-something else is at play in deeming race and
national origin plaintiffs as bringing less worthy cases. In other words,
the difference in disposition rates suggests the possibility that the race
neutral explanations of employment discrimination litigation are in-
complete. This is the subject of the next Part.
III. THE DIFFERENCE IN RACE
This Part first argues that the difference between race and gender
cases and all employment discrimination cases indicates that race neu-
tral errors in the judiciary's evaluate function are incomplete in their
description of judicial decisionmaking and that an anti-race plaintiff
ideology exists. Secondly, I examine the limits in the future ofjudicial
decisionmaking given the anti-race plaintiff ideology infecting race
employment discrimination cases.
A. Anti-race Plaintiff Ideology
In their analysis of employment discrimination cases as a whole,
Clermont, Eisenberg, and Schwab have described an "anti-plaintiff
bias."1 99 One example given of that bias is that employment discrimi-
197 Colker examined the trial outcomes in 615 private disability cases in a database
compiled by the ABA. See Colker, ADA Windfall, supra note 8, at 109. The win rate for
defendants was 92.7%. See id. Similarly, in the national study, claims of disability
discrimination that were filed also in the Title VII race case had a win rate on the
disability claim of only 13%, the lowest win rate on a non-Title VII race claim. See
infra Table Al.
198 See supra Part II.C; note 104 and accompanying text.
199 Even if employment discrimination plaintiffs beat the odds and win at the trial
court level, they face an "anti-plaintiff effect in federal appellate courts," meaning
they are much more likely to lose an appeal than defendants. See Clermont & Eisen-
berg, Realities, supra note 2, at 153; Clermont & Schwab, supra note 2, at 451; Cler-
mont, Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 2, at 554; see also Clermont & Eisenberg, Jury or
Judge, supra note 2 at 155 ("The appellate court is more favorable to the defendant
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nation plaintiffs are much more likely to be reversed on appeal than
other defendants. 200 Lurking within employment discrimination liti-
gation, I think, are categories of cases that fare particularly poorly.
Plaintiffs alleging race and national origin discrimination are one ex-
ample of this. Very little about particular case characteristics, or com-
bination of characteristics, indicates why race and national origin
cases are so hard for plaintiffs to win. 20 1 Instead, almost all types of
cases are lost. Race plaintiffs are also less likely to settle and more
likely to lose a pretrial judgment than gender plaintiffs20 2 and less
likely to settle than all employment discrimination cases.
203
I'm doubtful the disposition differences are because race cases
have less merit. Plaintiffs' attorneys face the same economic decision
in deciding whether to file a race, gender, or any employment dis-
crimination case, and the plaintiffs' and defendants' bars are similar
for all types of employment discrimination claims.204 The governing
than is the trial judge and the jury.... [T]he big difference between appellate court
and trial jury is more surely owing to the appellate judges' sizable misperceptions
regarding the jury.").
Others have also found a judicial bias. See Oppenheimer, supra note 10, at 566
("The most likely explanation is judicial and juror bias against women and minorities,
with particularly strong bias against 'older' women and black women."); Schultz &
Petterson, supra note 9, at 1165 ("[T]he decline in plaintiffs' success rates reflects in
part a shift toward less pro-plaintiff standards for evaluating the validity of the lack of
interest defense in race discrimination cases."); Selmi, supra note 2, at 562 ("[C]ourts
often analyze race cases from an anti-affirmative action mindset, one that views both
the persistence of discrimination and the merits of the underlying claims with deep
skepticism.").
200 Plaintiffs who won at trial are reversed on appeal about 42% of the time, while
defendants who win trials are reversed on appeal only about 7% of the time. Cler-
mont, Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 2, at 552. Similarly, plaintiffs who win at the
pretrial stage lose 42% of the time, compared to defendants' 11% reversal of defend-
ants' pretrial wins. Id.; see also Clermont & Schwab, supra note 2, at 450 (reporting
reversal rates when defendants appeal plaintiffs' pretrial victories at 45% and reversal
rates when plaintiffs appeal defendants' pretrial victories at 11%). Other studies for
particular types of employment discrimination lawsuits reported similar findings. See
Colker, supra note 150, at 540 (reporting an 83% success rate for ADA defendants on
appeal); Schultz & Petterson, supra note 9, at 1162 (in cases with the lack of interest
defense finding that "plaintiffs' success rate on appeal fell from 90 percent in the
earlier period to only 33.3 percent in the later period").
201 See supra Part I.D.
202 See supra Part II.C.1-2.
203 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
204 Plaintiffs and defendants themselves "face much the same economic incen-
tives. For plaintiffs and their attorneys, those incentives should discourage weak
claims." Clermont, Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 2, at 565; see Selmi, supra note 2,
at 569-70 (discussing the economic incentives of employment discrimination
lawyers).
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law for each type of discrimination shares much of the same standards
for demonstrating liability.
Nor do I think that the difference can be explained because race
cases are more susceptible to winnable summary judgment motions
than gender cases or employment discrimination cases as a whole. In
all employment cases, including nonharassment claims, issues that are
not easily translated into a successful summary judgment motion
predominate. Regardless of the type of discrimination alleged, a key
issue is often whether the employee's performance was satisfactory
and whether the employee was entitled to the challenged action. All
of this depends on credibility and inferences from behavior which are
not easy matters to prove via summary judgment, where " [t] he evi-
dence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable infer-
ences are to be drawn in his favor"20 5 and where material facts must be
found as a matter of law to favor only one party.
Although many use the term "bias" in describing their results,206 I
adopt a different phrase here-"anti-race plaintiff ideology"-for what
I witness in race and national origin cases. Bias and ideology both
capture the idea that courts are not receptive to plaintiffs' claims. Yet,
I think ideology is a better description of what occurs in race and na-
tional origin cases. Courts almost certainly believe that racial discrimi-
nation in the workplace is wrong, unlike the immediate reaction of
some judges to Brown v. Board of Education,20 7 which was clearly a
bias.20 8 The courts today are not seeking to undermine employment
discrimination jurisprudence. Instead, the judiciary believes quite
often that the particular situation before it demonstrates no discrimi-
nation-that the plaintiffs' claims lack legal merit and the defendants
are right as a matter of law. The attitude reflects a world view at odds
with the premise underlying the particular plaintiff's lawsuit.20 9 This
ideology is defined further in the next Part by examining what it tells
us about future judicial reform.
205 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). This is not to sug-
gest that summaryjudgment should never be awarded in employment discrimination
cases, just that it should be of equal difficulty across the many types of discrimination.
For an excellent analysis of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases,
see Beiner, supra note 51, at 86-97.
206 See supra note 199.
207 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
208 See generally J. HARvIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME
COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 80-87 (1979) (describing the resis-
tance of some Southern judges to Brown).
209 See Selmi, supra note 2, at 574 ("[D] octrine is rarely sufficiently restraining to
limit the bias of courts, and where the Supreme Court leaves room for discretion it
invariably leaves room for bias.").
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B. Future Judicial Decisionmaking
This Part turns to the question of what the anti-race plaintiff ide-
ology tells us about the future of judicial decisionmaking. I specifi-
cally argue that in race cases the problem is more fundamental than
the current literature suggests-that courts generally know about sub-
tle discrimination and courts are more than hesitant to make employ-
ers explain their actions. Instead, the judiciary appears to agree with
defendants in race and national origin cases that plaintiffs' cases are
without legal merit. The judiciary validates and approves the defend-
ants' position not because of deference, but from a perception that
discredits the likelihood of plaintiffs' claims and validates the defend-
ants' story. This ideology may be present in all employment discrimi-
nation cases, but is particularly pronounced in race cases.
1. The Ideology Represents Agreement with Defendants, Not
Deference to Defendants
For two reasons, I think the courts are doing more than deferring
to defendants-instead they are agreeing with the defendants on the
merits. Both reasons bear on the inadequacy of proof that employ-
ment at will and deference are important to the judiciary. First, courts
almost never mention the employment at will doctrine or deference
in their decisions. 210 It is almost impossible to prove that deference or
210 I found only two of the 467 opinions in the national study that use the words
"defer" or "deference" in ways other than noting a delay in timing (i.e., deferring the
decision on a pending motion) or the notion of deference to administrative agencies.
One opinion was discussing deference in a First Amendment claim, a matter outside
the scope of the study. See Caruso v. City of Cocoa, 260 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1209 (M.D.
Fla. 2003). One opinion lends very small support to the idea ofjudicial deference to
employers. See Buggs v. Powell, 293 F. Supp. 2d 135, 144 (D.D.C. 2003) ("'In a close
case, a reasonable juror would usually assume that the employer is more capable of
assessing the significance of small differences in the qualifications of the candidates,
or that the employer simply made a judgment call. But this does not mean that a
reasonable juror would in every case defer to the employer's assessment.'" (quoting
Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc))).
Courts referenced the phrase "employment at will" rarely. The text of only nine
of the 467 opinions used the term, but none of the uses implied in any way ajudicial
commitment to the concept. Four cases discussed the term in the context of state
causes of action such as negligent discharge and breach of contract. See Smith v.
Diamond Offshore Mgmt. Co., No. CIV. A. 03-2024, 2003 WL 23095586 (E.D. La. Dec.
23, 2003); Keeley v. Cisco Sys., No. CIV. A. 301CV1504D, 2003 WL 21919771 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 8, 2003); Alexander v. Excel Meats, No. CIV. A. 5:02-CV-041-C, 2003 WL
21353924 (N.D. Tex. June 9, 2003); Ijames v. Murdock, No. 1:01CV00093, 2003 WL
1533448 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 21, 2003). Three cases examined whether employment at
will employment agreements were covered by § 1981. See Wells v. Hosp. Group of Ill.,
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the employment at will doctrine is driving a court's acceptance of de-
fendants' explanations when the court says nothing to that effect.
The thought processes of a judge, apart from the written opinion, are
clearly difficult to ascertain. The court's acceptance of defendant's
explanation for the challenged action could reflect any number of
values other than a commitment to employment at will or deference
to employers.
Second, not only do courts rarely mention deference, it is incon-
sistent with how the courts in fact are treating the cases. Perhaps the
easiest way to demonstrate this is by contrast to school desegregation
where deference is a common explanation of decisionmaking, as it is
in other types of public law litigation. 2
11
Deference as an explanation for judicial decisionmaking typically
indicates that there is some ambiguity in the law or the facts, and the
courts decide to defer to one party's arguments to resolve that ambi-
guity. For example, in school desegregation cases courts are to elimi-
nate the present-day effects of past discrimination, but everyone
admits we can't know what the world would look like absent the
school district's discrimination, nor do we know how to achieve that
world.212 While employment discrimination law clearly has its ambi-
guity, it at least asks more answerable question (did plaintiff prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in this instance
No. 92 C 6111, 2003 WL 21704416 (N.D. I11. July 23, 2003); Herron v. Daimler
Chrysler Corp., 267 F. Supp. 2d 941 (S.D. Ind. 2003); Spielman v. Fisher Printing,
Inc., No. 02 C 7454, 2003 WL 1090360 (N.D. Il. Mar. 10, 2003). One other case
quoted the term from an employee handbook, in a discussion about the employer's
attendance policies. See Williams v. Aviall Servs., Inc., No. CIV. A. 3:01-CV-2151, 2003
WL 21018567, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2003). Finally, one court used the term in
deciding whether an employee suffered an adverse employment action when neither
job offer had job security. See Musgrove v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. 3:99-CV-1562-P, 2003
WL 21653125, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 1, 2003).
Derum and Engle also argue that the commitment to employment at will and the
corresponding deference can arise when a court presumes that personal animosity is
not reflective of any discrimination. See Derum & Engle, supra note 5, at 1179. Yet, in
the 467 opinions, I found only seventeen opinions that referenced the terms "person-
ality" or "personal animosity," and four of those times the concepts helped plaintiffs
prevail. See Buggs v. Powell, 293 F. Supp. 2d 135; Sullivan v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch.
Dist., 281 F. Supp. 2d 689 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Canady v.John Morrell & Co., 247 F. Supp.
2d 1107 (N.D. Iowa 2003); Forts v. City of N.Y. Dep't of Corr., No. 00 Civ. 1716 LTS
FM, 2003 WL 21297299 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2003).
211 Sturm has earlier explored this deference in public law cases. See generally Su-
san P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 1412 (1991)
("The deferrer model of remedial process . . . undermines the court's legitimacy
in . . . important respects.").
212 See Parker, Decline, supra note 33, at 1645-52.
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discriminated). One can argue about the nature of the proof, but no
one would contend that the question is completely and always unan-
swerable. School desegregation, on the other hand, asks an unanswer-
able question. That is, deference to one party is practically compelled
in school desegregation and other public law cases.
Further, in school desegregation, the Supreme Court has held
that the courts should defer to the defendants in what the remedy
should and should not include, and courts explicitly do so. 213 The
deference in school desegregation also draws on the federalism impli-
cations of federal judges deciding how to structure and run local
schools. 2 14 These cases are rarely decided without an evidentiary
hearing; summary judgment practice is almost unheard of. These
procedural postures suggest the presence of arguable facts, not factual
certainty.
In employment discrimination cases, on the other hand, defer-
ence lacks such legitimacy as a decisionmaking tool. The Supreme
Court has never articulated a role for deference in employment dis-
crimination, and federalism is a nonissue in suits against private em-
ployers and the federal government. The courts behave as if there is
no ambiguity in the outcome. Trials are very infrequent; instead de-
fendants are most often winning on pretrial motions that require
judges stating that they believe they have reached the "right" result "as
a matter of law." In granting defendants a summary judgment, the
court must reach the conclusion that reasonable jurors could only
find for defendants.
Further, summary judgment forces defendants to go beyond the
pleadings to prove the inadequacy of plaintiffs' case. This very often
involves proof of plaintiffs' lack of qualifications or proof of defend-
ants' legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. In both summary judg-
ment situations, defendants are usually setting forth their own
affirmative proof, rather than simply pointing to plaintiffs' lack of
proof. The court thus engages in determining the issues surrounding
the challenged action in granting defendants' summary judgment mo-
tion. The cases, decided most often by pretrial motion, therefore
seem to include more than deference to employers, but an agreement
with defendants. While employment discrimination legal standards
certainly offer some ambiguity and choice, courts are behaving as if
the particular cases they are deciding themselves offer no ambiguity
213 See Parker, Connecting, supra note 33, at 1731-39 Liability is rarely litigated in
school desegregation cases, and the meaning of the right at stake is largely defined by
the remedy. See Parker, supra note 32, at 514-19.
214 See Parker, Connecting, supra note 33, at 1746-60.
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or choice in defendant's win. And I see no reason not to take the
judges' word on this as at least a partial explanation of what is driving
the courts-that is, that judges believe defendants are right as a mat-
ter of law, with no ambiguity or deference involved in reaching that
conclusion.
By drawing this distinction between an anti-race plaintiff ideology
and the employment at will doctrine and deference, I don't mean to
suggest that courts never defer to defendants or that courts are never
hesitant to undercut the employment at will doctrine. I'm instead
suggesting that in addition to deference and a commitment to em-
ployment at will, courts also have an ideology that discounts the possi-
bility of discrimination in race and national origin cases.
2. The Ideology Suggests that Changing the Courts Is More
Difficult than Previously Believed
Recognizing the different treatment of the various types of em-
ployment discrimination claims is necessary in any attempt at reform,
for it begs the question of whether courts can be reformed internally,
an issue altogether different from the concern of whether courts
should be reformed. That is, if the judiciary in fact has an anti-race
plaintiff ideology, why would we expect the judiciary to one day be
more receptive to the possibility of race discrimination in employment
and change the way it treats these cases? The difference in outcomes
also raises the question of whether the answer to both questions-can
and should judicial decisionmaking be changed-will differ depend-
ing on the type of discrimination.
For example, an anti-plaintiff ideology in race and national origin
cases calls into question how seriously courts would take their pro-
posed role in Sturm's "structural approach" to redressing second gen-
eration employment discrimination, even if the Supreme Court made
clear that the law required such an approach. Sturm, drawing upon
her important work on public law remedial process,2 15 has proposed a
structural process for employment discrimination that includes almost
every conceivable player-employees, employers, lawyers, insurance
companies and brokers, administrative agencies, and organizations
are all there-and also a redefined role for the judiciary.2 16 Through
a "dynamic" process, these players would come together to redress dis-
crimination. She specifically redefines the court's role as follows:
215 See Sturm, supra note 211.
216 Sturm, supra note 5, at 524-37.
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Courts would thus not unilaterally construct or articulate stan-
dards for effective internal conflict resolution mechanisms to be
adopted or followed by employers as a basis for avoiding liability.
Instead, they would participate in creating a structure for employ-
ers, with the assistance of mediating actors, to develop and evaluate
the effectiveness of the employers' internal systems.
21 7
Sturm conceptualizes the court as being a "catalyst"2 18 that will create
'judicially elaborated . . .legal norms"2 1 9 that give employers "incen-
tives"2 20 with "enforcement" in limited situations.22 1 While Sturm's
approach limits some of the judiciary's current power,2 22 she still de-
pends on some possibility that the court will disagree with defendants
and will articulate the norms of employment discrimination laws.
As is hopefully clear by now, I am left unconvinced that most
courts will engage in the role Sturm assigns them in race and national
origin cases alleging disparate treatment. She is right, I believe, to
develop a strong role for employers in identifying and redressing the
causes and manifestations of subtle discrimination. 2 23 This has been a
prominent part of her articulation of the public law remedial process
that has rightly recognized the limits of courts acting alone to redress
matters such as prison reform and school segregation.2 24 But I'm not
sure courts would provide much of a check on this process.
In a way, she and I are talking about a different set of cases. By
definition she is focusing on sexual harassment claims and subjective
employment actions that have a disparate impact.2 25 My focus on the
run-of-the-mill race and national origin disparate treatment claim is
entirely different. Yet, the courts are not so divided; what we learn
217 See id. at 560.
218 Id. at 521, 557.
219 Id. at 522.
220 Id. at 557.
221 Id. at 558.
222 See id. at 555.
223 See id. at 559 ("Courts would look to employers to develop and justify criteria of
effectiveness in problem solving for their own internal systems."); see also id. at 543-46
(developing the role of employers in more detail).
224 See Sturm, supra note 211. She recognizes the connection with her prior work,
but also an important distinction: "In many respects, the role I advocate is simply an
extension of my earlier work articulating a normative theory for the role of courts in
public remedial decisionmaking. However, in the structural workplace regime, the
court's role is not limited to shaping this process upon a finding of a violation. ...
Instead, it establishes the general norm, and it then creates the incentives for employ-
ers to create processes that comply with the norm and help solve more general
problems connected to fair and efficient decisonmaking under conditions of com-
plexity and diversity." Sturm, supra note 5, at 562.
225 See Sturm, supra note 5, at 468-69.
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about courts in one area often reveals how courts will behave in an-
other area. My point is that we should be extremely cautious about
the judiciary articulating norms or enforcing norms that recognize
that employers themselves can't take care of any problem with existing
workplace racial and ethnic discrimination. Judges, in other words,
seem to be opting out of race and national origin disparate treatment
cases-because employers are right-and I'm uncertain whether they
would not also do the same in race and national origin impact cases.
Sexual discrimination cases are another matter altogether; here courts
appear more receptive to disagreeing with defendants. 226 But for race
and national origin cases, I'm far from hopeful that courts will use any
power given to them to "encourage" employers to do something they
already don't want to do.
This is not to suggest, however, that we turn away from the courts
altogether in efforts to redress racial and ethnic employment discrimi-
nation. I cannot ignore that courts offer plaintiffs the value of a pub-
lic forum in which to tell their stories and hopefully to resolve their
claims.227 More fundamentally, it is unclear whether plaintiffs have a
better venue option. Arbitration is a possibility, 228 but only limited
empirical work examines the treatment of civil rights employment
cases decided by arbitration.2 29 Rather than calling for an exit from
226 Yet, gender discrimination is supposedly better addressed by employers. See id.
at 555.
227 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
228 The Supreme Court has affirmed the enforceability of arbitration agreements
for employment discrimination suits. See Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). Arbitration
agreements do not preclude the EEOC from filing its own suit. See EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002). The Supreme Court has not reached the issue of
whether an enforceable arbitration agreement also precludes the filing of a class ac-
tion. See generally Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality
opinion) (split over whether to reach the merits of such a question).
229 Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment
Claims: An Empirical Comparison, Disp. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004, at 44 nn. 2 & 7;
Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under
the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 777
(2003); William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: "%at Re-
ally Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?, Disp. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40;
Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REv. 29 (1998); David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing
the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN,. L. REV.
1557 (2005).
In noncivil rights employment claims, Ted Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill found
no difference in win rates or in awards for higher-paid employees in arbitrations by
the American Arbitration Association. Eisenberg & Hill, supra, at 47. The data was
too limited to draw a similar conclusion for lower-paid employees. See id. For civil
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the judiciary, this Article seeks to change the terms of the debate to
recognize that courts treat types of employment discrimination cases
differently. In other words, this Article seeks to begin a discussion on
which judicial reforms would be appropriate for what types of discrim-
ination. This necessarily entails recognizing that discrimination
claims face a hierarchy of preferences in the judiciary and thatjudges
are placing particular hardships on race and national origin plaintiffs.
In sum, the unconscious discrimination infecting American society in-
fects its judiciary as well.
23 0
CONCLUSION
This Article provides a comprehensive, national examination of
routine race and national origin employment discrimination lawsuits.
Although all types of employment discrimination cases are "hard to
win,"231 that difficulty is especially pronounced for race and national
origin claims. These types of cases are proving almost impossible to
win in federal court. Plaintiffs' only true chance for a recovery is set-
tlement, and here the options are more limited than they are for
other cases. Race cases settle at lower rates than employment discrim-
ination cases as a whole. 23 2 They are also treated worse than gender
employment discrimination cases-they are harder to settle, and de-
fendants are more likely to win a pretrial judgment in their favor.
233
Some readers may argue that I have overstated plaintiffs' slim
chances for success. After all, race and national origin plaintiffs can
and still do settle more than half of their lawsuits, and this bargaining
takes place in the "shadow of the law." If you define these settlements
as plaintiffs' judicial victories, then the odds are far from bad. Yet, I
can't ignore one particularly disheartening outcome that, to me, dem-
onstrates an anti-race plaintiff ideology that seriously erodes plaintiffs'
bargaining power. While individual cases may have an acceptable res-
olution, considering race and national origin cases collectively
presents a different picture.
fights employment claims, they found that "the award results were consistent with
arbitrators acting similarly to in-court adjudicators." Id. at 50-51. Yet, their data for
civil rights claims was so limited that it is hard to draw firm conclusions from the
results. See id. at 50. For example, they only had eight observations of arbitration
resolutions. See id. at 49.
230 See Selmi, supra note 2, at 561-62.
231 Id. at 555.
232 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
233 See Part I1.C.2.
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In the race cases in the two studies that didn't settle and that the
court resolved on the merits-421 out of 656 unique cases 234-plain-
tiffs won only six cases.235 (This outcome certainly does not translate
to a national win rate, but only reflects the win rates of the cases stud-
ied herein.) The shockingly low win rate, coupled with the overall
lower settlement rate as compared to plaintiffs in all employment dis-
crimination cases 23 6 and the low percentage of settlements even when
plaintiff prevailed on a pretrial motion 237 and the more favorable
plaintiff outcomes in gender cases, 238 to me demonstrates that race
and national origin plaintiffs face particularly difficult hurdles. Al-
though plaintiffs bargaining for settlements do so in the shadow of
the law and with the threat of a jury trial, that shadow actually just
hangs over the plaintiffs, who must settle or almost certainly get noth-
ing. Defendants, on the other hand, are bargaining, basking almost,
in bright sunshine from the courts. If we are to bring sunshine to
both sides of the typical race and national origin suit, and clarity to
our current understanding of judicial decisionmaking in these cases,
then we must recognize that courts are doing more than deferring to
defendants. Instead, they seem particularly hesitant of certain types of
claims, including race and national origin ones. Only by recognizing
the unique challenges of race and national origin cases can we one
day overcome them.
234 That is, 467 opinions in the national study, covering 464 unique cases, and 192
cases in the case filing study. For the 656 unique cases, 199 cases settled, twenty-four
cases were resolved without reaching the merits, and twelve were pending when this
Article went to press. See supra notes 53, 103-14, 156-62 and accompanying text; see
also infra Tables Al, A3 & A4.
235 For the six plaintiffs wins, plaintiffs won a jury trial in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in the case filing study; a jury trial in a case in the national study in
which the defendant won on the motion reported in the opinion, but part of the
plaintiffs' race and national origin claims remained; and four jury trials in cases in the
national study in which the plaintiffs won in the reported opinion. See supra Table 2;
supra notes 112, 158 and accompanying text; see also infra Table A3. For the 421
defendant wins, in the national study defendants won 329 pretrial judgments in the
reported opinions studied; five wins in cases in which the defendant won on the mo-
tion reported in the opinion, but part of the plaintiffs' race and national origin claims
remained; and forty-two wins in cases in which the plaintiff won in the reported opin-
ion. See supra Table 2; supra notes 153, 158 and accompanying text. In the case filing
study, defendants had thirty-three wins in Texas, and twelve wins in Pennsylvania. See
supra note 112 and accompanying text; see also infra Tables A3 & A4.
236 See note 104 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
238 See supra Part II.C.1-2.
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APPENDIX1
TABLE Al. NATIONAL STUDY OF REPORTED DISTRICT COURT
OPINIONS: DATA SUMMARY
Plaintiff
Variable Number % Win
Rate
All Cases 467 100.0 27.4
Plaintiff Pro Se
No 374 80.1 30.2
Yes 93 19.9 16.1
Number of Plaintiffs
One 440 94.2 26.8
More than one 27 5.8 37.0
Plaintiff's Gender
Female 183 39.2 27.3
Male 277 59.3 27.1
Both 6 1.3 50.0
Nonascertainable 1 .2 .0
Plaintiff's Race
African American or Black 281 60.2 26.7
Asian or Pacific Islander 13 2.8 38.5
Hispanic 37 7.9 29.7
Middle Eastern decent 16 3.4 37.5
Multi-racial individual 5 1.1 20.0
Multi-racial group 4 .9 25.0
Native American 4 .9 .0
White, non-Hispanic 46 9.9 21.7
Nonascertainable 61 13.1 31.1
Plaintiff's Occupation
Administrative 47 10.1 29.8
Blue Collar (including supervisory blue) 139 29.8 31.7
Clerical 37 7.9 18.9
Law enforcement/firefighter 35 7.5 31.4
Other white collar 134 28.7 23.9
Technical 14 3.0 35.7
Nonascertainable 61 13.1 24.6
1 This Appendix contains most of the data analyzed in this Article. The data not
in this Appendix can be accessed online. See Technical Appendix, supra note 74. The
Technical Appendix includes all the data and output files and coding sheets used
herein.
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Plaintiff
Variable Number % Win
Rate
Plaintiff's Union Membership Mentioned in
Opinion
No/not mentioned in opinion 391 83.7 27.4
Yes 76 16.3 27.6
Plaintiff's Theory
Disparate treatment only 447 95.7 28.0
Both disDarate impact and treatment 20 4.3 15.0
Plaintiff's Adlegations of Discrimination
Race-Yes 419 89.7 26.5
Race-No 48 10.3 35.4
National origin-Yes 112 24.0 26.8
National origin-No 355 76.0 27.6
Color-Yes 29 6.2 27.6
Color-No 438 93.8 27.4
Sex/gender-Yes 115 24.6 27.0
Sex/gender-No 352 75.4 27.6
Disability-Yes 56 12.0 19.6
Disability-No 411 88.0 28.5
Age-Yes 76 16.3 23.7
Age-No 391 83.7 28.1
Religion-Yes 24 5.1 25.0
Religion-No 443 94.9 27.5
Publication
Published in official reporters 145 31.0 29.7
Not published in official reporters 322 69.0 26.4
Race and Gender of District Court Judges
African American female 15 3.2 26.7
African American male 41 8.8 22.0
Asian American male 4 .9 50.0
Hispanic male 27 5.8 25.9
White female 87 18.6 31.0
White male 293 62.7 27.0
EEOC/DOT a Plaintiff in Case
No 464 99.4 27.6
Yes 3 .6 .0
Public Interest Group or Amicus Involved in
Case
No 467 100.0 27.4
Type of Defendants
Private employer 240 51.4 26.3
Federal government 68 14.6 23.5
State or local government 157 33.6 31.2
Both government and private employer 2 .4 .0
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Plaintiff
Variable Number % Win
Rate
Procedural Posture of Court's Decision
Rule 12 motion for dismissal 74 15.8 41.9
Rule 56 motion for summary judgment 393 84.2 24.7
Plaintiff's Claim-Win Rate on Case When
Allegations Made
Failure to hire 18 3.9 16.7
Demotion 19 4.1 42.1
Failure to promote 130 27.8 27.7
Failure to reinstate 6 1.3 33.3
Harassment/hostile work environment 171 36.6 33.9
(pre-opposition) I -
Retaliation (post-opposition) 236 50.5 32.2
Discharge 184 39.4 23.4
Constructive discharge 35 7.5 25.7
Terms and conditions-pay-related 87 18.6 36.8
Terms and conditions-not pay-related 151 32.3 25.8
Plaintiff's Claim-Win Rate on Individual Claim
Failure to hire 18 3.9 11.1
Demotion 19 4.1 21.1
Failure to promote 130 27.8 16.2
Failure to reinstate 6 1.3 33.3
Harassment/hostile work environment 171 36.6 18.7
(pre-opposition)
Retaliation (post-opposition) 236 50.5 19.9
Discharge 184 39.4 17.9
Constructive discharge 35 7.5 17.1
Terms and conditions-pay-related 87 18.6 24.1
Terms and conditions-not pay-related 151 32.3 16.6
Plaintiffs' Win Rate on Non-Title VII Race
Claims-Win Rate on Individual Claim
§ 1983 and race/national origin/color 62 13.3 21.0
State civil rights claim(s) 104 22.3 25.0
State tort claim(s) 56 12.0 14.3
Federal gender/sex discrimination claim(s) 85 18.2 27.1
Federal disability discrimination claim(s) 54 11.6 13.0
Federal age discrimination claim(s) 73 15.6 20.5
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Plaintiff
Variable Number % Win
Rate
Defenses-Win Rate on Case When Allegation
Made
Legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 251 53.7 25.1
Failure to demonstrate prima facie case 374 80.1 29.7
EEOC procedural requirements 202 43.3 38.6
Defenses-Win Rate on Individual Defense
Legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 251 53.7 21.5
Failure to demonstrate prima facie case 374 80.1 35.8
EEOC procedural requirements 202 43.3 31.3
Request for Punitive Damages Mentioned in
Opinion
No/missing 434 92.9 26.3
Yes 33 7.1 42.4
Costs Awarded to Defendant 4 .9 .0
Federal District Courts Organized by Circuit
First Circuit 7 1.5 14.3
Second Circuit 110 23.6 31.8
Third Circuit 28 6.0 39.3
Fourth Circuit 41 8.8 17.1
Fifth Circuit 60 12.8 38.3
Sixth Circuit 18 3.9 16.7
Seventh Circuit 106 22.7 20.8
Eighth Circuit 23 4.9 43.5
Ninth Circuit 16 3.4 6.3
Tenth Circuit 19 4.1 47.4
Eleventh Circuit 24 5.1 8.3
D.C. Circuit 15 3.2 26.7
Federal District Courts
Alabama Middle District 5 1.1 .0
Alabama Northern District 1 .2 .0
Arizona District 2 .4 50.0
Arkansas Eastern District 2 .4 100.0
California Northern District 13 2.8 .0
Connecticut District 15 3.2 60.0
Delaware District 5 1.1 0.0
District of Columbia 15 3.2 26.7
Horida Middle District 2 .4 50.0
Florida Northern District 1 .2 .0
Florida Southern District 10 2.1 10.0
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Plaintiff
Variable Number % Win
Rate
Georgia Northern District 5 1.1 .0
Illinois Central District 1 .2 100.0
Illinois Northern District 95 20.3 20.0
Illinois Southern District 1 .2 .0
Indiana Southern District 9 1.9 22.2
Iowa Northern District 3 .6 66.7
Iowa Southern District 2 .4 .0
Kansas District 19 4.1 47.4
Kentucky Western District 2 .4 .0
Louisiana Eastern District 11 2.4 45.5
Louisiana Middle District 2 .4 .0
Louisiana Western District 1 .2 .0
Maryland District 17 3.6 11.8
Massachusetts District 3 .6 33.3
Michigan Eastern District 4 .9 .0
Minnesota District 9 1.9 44.4
Mississippi Northern District 1 .2 100.0
Missouri Eastern District 1 .2 .0
Missouri Western District 3 .6 33.3
Nebraska District 3 .6 33.3
New Hampshire District 1 .2 .0
New Jersey District 1 .2 100.0
New York Eastern District 15 3.2 46.7
New York Northern District 1 .2 .0
New York Southern District 73 15.6 23.3
New York Western District 6 1.3 33.3
North Carolina Middle District 15 3.2 20.0
Ohio Northern District 5 1.1 .0
Ohio Southern District 4 .9 50.0
Oregon District 1 .2 .0
Pennsylvania Eastern District 19 4.1 47.4
Pennsylvania Western District 1 .2 0.0
Puerto Rico District 3 .6 .0
South Carolina District 1 .2 .0
Tennessee Eastern District 2 .4 .0
Tennessee Western District 1 .2 100.0
Texas Eastern District 3 .6 66.7
Texas Northern District 34 7.3 3A.2
Texas Southern District 1 .2 .0
Texas Western District 7 1.5 28.6
Virgin Islands District 2 .4 50.0
Virginia Eastern District 2 .4 .0
Virginia Western District 1 .2 .0
Wisconsin Eastern District 1 .2 100.0
Wisconsin Western District 4 .9 25.0
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TABLE A2. LOGISTIC REGRESSION SHOWING FACTORS INFLUENCING
PLAINTIFFS' WINS IN NATIONAL STUDY OF 2003 TITLE VII
RACE OPINIONS
Estimate Odds
Independent Variables Coefficient P Value Ratio
Plaintiff's Race
Omitted reference variable =
nonascertainable
Asian or Pacific Islander .323 .610 1.382
Black -.217 .480 .805
Hispanic -.067 .883 .935
Middle Eastern descent .282 .630 1.326
Multi-racial individual -.593 .607 .553
Multi-racial group -.305 .797 .737
Native American -20.410 .999 .000
White, non-Hispanic -.488 .280 .614
Plaintiff's Gender
Omitted reference variable female
Plaintiff male -.005 .981 .995
Plaintiff both .986 .237 2.680
Plaintiff's Occupation
Omitted reference variable = other
white collar
Administrative .302 .424 1.352
Blue collar (including supervisory .390 .153 1.476
blue)
Clerical -.296 .525 .744
Law enforcement/firefighter .379 .363 1.461
Technical .571 .336 1.771
Nonascertainable .039 .914 1.039
Other Characteristics of Plaintiffs
Plaintiff pro se -.794 .009+  .452
Plaintiff's union membership .039 .890 1.040
More than one plaintiff .389 .350 1.476
Type of Defendants
Omitted reference variable = private
employer
Federal government -.146 .650 .864
State or local government .243 .283 1.275
Both government and private -20.170 .999 .000
employer _1
2oo6]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Estimate Odds
Independent Variables Coefficient P Value Ratio
T p e of Discrimination Alleged . .. . .. . .
Race discrimination claim -.737 .087* .478
National origin discrimination claim -.343 .294 .709
Color discrimination claim .176 .691 1.193
Gender discrimination claim -.017 .947 .984
Disability discrimination claim -.420 .242 .657
Age discrimination claim -.182 .545 .834
Religion discrimination claim -.246 .631 .782
Type of Race Claim Alleged
Failure to hire claim .007 .315 1.007
Demotion claim -.006 .255 .994
Failure to promote claim .002 .529 1.002
Reinstatement -.003 .707 .997
Harassment claim -.004 .111 .996
Retaliation claim -.004 .058* .996
Discharge claim .004 .116 1.004
Constructive discharge claim .003 .492 1.003
Terms and conditions-pay-related -.005 .084* .995
claim
Terms and conditions-not pay- .004 .093 1.004
related claim
Types of Defenses Alleged
Legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason .003 .143 1.003
defense
Failure to demonstrate prima facie -.010 .002t .990
case defense
EEOC procedural rules defense -.005 .027t .995
District Courts Organized by Circuit
Omitted reference variable = Fourth
Circuit
First Circuit -.211 .855 .810
Second Circuit .818 .077* 2.267
Third Circuit 1.145 .044t 3.143
Fifth Circuit 1.105 .025t 3.019
Sixth Circuit -.029 .969 .971
Seventh Circuit .241 .615 1.272
Eighth Circuit 1.318 .026t 3.736
Ninth Circuit -1.128 .311 .324
Tenth Circuit 1.475 .017t 4.371
Eleventh Circuit -.817 .335 .422
D.C. Circuit .569 .427 1.766
* Difference approaching statistical significance at .10 level.
t Difference approaching statistical significance at .05 level.
I Difference approaching statistical significance at .01 level.
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TABLE A3. CASE FILING STUDY OF EASTERN DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA: DATA SUMMARY OF RACE CASES
Variable Number %*
All Cases 82 100
Final Disposition
Dismissed-settled 64 78
Involuntary dismissal 3 4
Judgment for plaintiff-pretrial motion 0 0
Judgment for plaintiff-jury trial 1 1
judgment for plaintiff-bench trial 0 0
judgment for defendant-pretrial motion 6 7
judgment for defendant-jury trial 3 4
Judgment for defendant-bench trial 0 0
Other nonmerits based dismissals in defendant's 3 4
favor
Pending 2 2
Defendant's First Pretrial Motion-Type
Motion to dismiss 14 17
Motion for summary judgment 13 16
Not applicable 55 67
Defendant's First Pretrial Motion-Outcome
Upheld plaintiff's claim, in whole or in part 19 23
Ruled in favor of defendant and case 6 7
dismissed
Ruled in favor of defendant and part of case alive 0 0
Case settled before court ruled 2 2
Not applicable 55 67
Defendant's Second Pretrial Motion-Typet
Motion to dismiss 3 4
Motion for summary judgment 5 6
Not applicable __74 90
Defendant's Second Pretrial Motion-Outcome
Upheld plaintiff's claim, in whole or in part 4 5
Ruled in favor of defendant and case dismissed 0 0
Ruled in favor of defendant and part of case 2 2
remains
Case settled before court ruled 1 1
Not applicable 74 90
Motion pending 1 1
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Variable Number %*
Type of Defendant
Private employer 64 78
Federal government 7 9




Costs Awarded to Defendant _......___ ....
No 82 100
Yes 0 0
Percentiles do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
t One case had a third motion, and the case settled before the court ruled on the
motion. Another case also had a third pretrial motion, and the motion was granted
after a jury verdict in defendant's favor.
RACE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
TABLE A4. CASE FILING STUDY OF NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS:
DATA SUMMARY OF RACE CASES
Variable Number %*
All Cases 110 100
Final Disposition
Dismissed-settled 64 58
Involuntary dismissal 13 12
Judgment for plaintiff-pretrial motion 0 0
Judgment for plaintiff-jury trial 0 0
Judgment for plaintiff-bench trial 0 0
Judgment for defendant-pretrial motion 28 26
Judgment for defendant-jury trial 2 2
Judgment for defendant-bench trial 0 0
Other nonmerits based dismissals in defendant's33
favor
Defendant's First Pretrial Motion-uType
Motion to dismiss 20 18
Motion for summary judgment 32 29
Not applicable 58 53
Defendant's First Pretrial Motion-Outcome
Upheld plaintiff's claim, in whole or in part 14 13
Ruled in favor of defendant and case dismissed 26 24
Ruled in favor of defendant and part of case alive 6 6
Case settled before court ruled 6 6
Not applicable _ 58 53
Defendant's Second Pretrial Motion-Type
Motion to dismiss 1 1
Motion for summary judgment 7 6
Not applicable 102 93
Defendant's Second Pretrial Motion-Outcome
Upheld plaintiff's claim, in whole or in part 3 3
Ruled in favor of defendant and case dismissed 5 5
Ruled in favor of defendant and part of caseremains00
Case setled before court ruled 0 0
Not applicable 102 93
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Private employer 91 83
Federal government 4 4
State of local government 15 14
Costs Awarded to Defendant
No 92 84
Yes 18 16






* Percentiles do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
RACE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
TABLE A5. CASE FILING STUDY: DATA SUMMARY OF GENDER CASES
Variable D Number %*
All Cases-Eastern District of Pennsylvania 100 100
Final Disposition
Dismissed-settled 87 87
Involuntary dismissal 3 3
judgment for plaintiff-pretrial motion 0 0
judgment for plaintiff-jury trial 0 0
judrment for plaintiff-bench trial 0 0
judgment for defendant-pretrial motion 6 6
Tudgment for defendant-jury trial 2 2
judgment for defendant-bench trial 0 0
Other nonmerits based dismissals in defendant's favor 1 1
Pending 1 1
All Cases-Northern District of Texas 72 100
Final Disposition
Dismissed-settled 52 72
Involuntary dismissal 8 11
judgment for plaintiff-pretrial motion 0 0
judgment for plaintiff-jury trial 0 0
Judgment for plaintiff-bench trial 0 0
ludzment for defendant-pretrial motion 10 14
ludLment for defendant-jury trial 0 0
judgment for defendant-bench trial 1 1
Other nonmerits based dismissals in defendant's favor 1 1
Pending 0 0
* Percentiles do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
20061
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TABLE A6. CASE FILING STUDY: DATA SUMMARY OF AGE CASES
Variable Number %*
All Cases-Eastern-District of Pennsylvania 77 100
Final Disposition
Dismissed-settled 60 78
Involuntary dismissal 1 1
Tudgment for plaintiff-pretrial motion 0 0
judgment for plaintiff-jury trial 2 3
judgment for plaintiff-bench trial 0 0
Tudgment for defendant-pretrial motion 13 17
judgment for defendant-jury trial 0 0
judgment for defendant-bench trial 0 0
Other nonmerits based dismissals in defendant's favor 1 1
All Cases-Northern District of Texas 32 100
Final Disposition
Dismissed-settled 17 53
Involuntary dismissal 5 16
judgment for plaintiff-pretrial motion 0 0
ludgment for plaintiff-jury trial 0 0
judgment for plaintiff-bench trial 0 0
Judgment for defendant-pretrial motion 7 22
judgment for defendant-jury trial 0 0
Judgment for defendant-bench trial 1 3
Other nonmerits based dismissals in defendant's favor 2 6
* Percentiles do not add up to 100 because of rounding.
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